[Un]Equal Justice under Law: The Invidiously Disparate Treatment of American Property Owners in Taking Cases by Kanner, Gideon
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-2007
[Un]Equal Justice under Law: The Invidiously
Disparate Treatment of American Property Owners
in Taking Cases
Gideon Kanner
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gideon Kanner, [Un]Equal Justice under Law: The Invidiously Disparate Treatment of American Property Owners in Taking Cases, 40 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 1065 (2007).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol40/iss3/7
"[UN]EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW":
THE INVIDIOUSLY DISPARATE TREATMENT
OF AMERICAN PROPERTY OWNERS
IN TAKING CASES
Gideon Kanner*
It is not by chance that the words "Equal Justice Under
Law" have been placed for all to see above the entrance to
this nation's highest court. If we are to expect our citizens
to treat one another with equal dignity and respect, the
justice system must serve as the great example of
maintaining that standard.1
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced
would give relief The federal remedy is supplementary to
the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and
refused before the federal one is invoked.2
"W~e have not the right to decline the exercise of...
jurisdiction simply because the rights asserted may be
adjudicated in some otherforum. "3
However, when it is alleged that property has been taken
without due process or adequate compensation in violation
of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment or the
Fourteenth Amendment, an adequate state remedy fore-
closes a [42 U.S. C. §] 1983 action because the availability
of that remedy precludes a violation of either constitutional
right.
4
* Professor of Law Emeritus, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Of counsel, Manatt,
Phelps & Phillips, LLP. Editor, Just Compensation. I gratefully acknowledge the research
assistance provided by Emily Madueno, J.D., 2007, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1. Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 So. 2d 354, 358 (Fla. 1995).
2. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
3. McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674 n.6 (1963) (quoting Stapleton v. Mitchell,
60 F. Supp. 51, 55 (1945), appeal dismissed pursuant to stipulation sub nom. Mitchell v.
McElroy, 326 U.S. 690 (1945)).
4. Brosterhous v. State Bar of Cal., 906 P.2d 1242, 1248 n.6 (Cal. 1996) (citations omitted).
Brosterhous does not explain how (notwithstanding the Federal Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST.
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Indeed, in some States the courts themselves ... refus[e]
to entertain any federal takings claim until the claimant
receives a final denial of compensation through all the
available state procedures. This precludes litigants from
asserting their federal takings claim even in state court
5
I. INTRODUCTION
Though the topic assigned to me at this symposium6 speaks of
"property rights," that is a misnomer. For, as Justice Potter Stewart
put it, "[p]roperty does not have rights"-people do.7 Justice Holmes
had earlier likewise admonished that in eminent domain law the
Constitution deals with people, not with tracts of land.' As one
knowledgeable commentator put it: "The idea that it is the rights of
the property owner that are protected by the Constitution (rather than
the more antiseptic idea of 'property rights') is one that needs
periodic repetition."9 I concur in that view. Speaking of property
rights in this context tends to depersonalize and thereby disparage a
vital constitutional guarantee on which personal liberty and security
of all other individual rights ultimately depend."° This conclusion is
art. VI) state courts can interpose themselves between the citizen and the federal courts and
foreclose the right to seek redress of violations of citizens' federal constitutional rights under a
federal statute that explicitly creates a right of action in federal courts, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000),
and confers jurisdiction upon them to do so, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. One would have thought
that this sort of thing died along with the short-lived "interposition doctrine" Southern
segregationists attempted to use in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1958) (reiterating the primacy of federal
law); cf Williams v. Horvath, 548 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Cal. 1976) (stressing in the context of a §
1983 action (involving assault and wrongful imprisonment) that "it is clear that the supremacy
clause will not permit a[n] ... abrogation of the perquisites of a federal civil rights litigant").
5. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 351-52 n.2 (2005)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (emphases added) (citations omitted). For an example of state
courts denying constitutionally aggrieved landowners an opportunity to have their federal cause
of action heard at all--either in state or in federal court-see Breneric Associates v. City of Del
Mar, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324, 338-39 (Ct. App. 1998)).
6. This article is based on my presentation, Comparing the Treatment of Property Rights to
the Protection Given to Other Rights Under the Bill of Rights, at the Third Annual Brigham-
Kanner Symposium on Property Rights, William & Mary College School of Law (Oct. 7, 2006).
7. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972); accord United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993).
8. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
9. Michael M. Berger, Government's Arrogance Gets the High Court's Attention, L.A.
DAILY J., Mar. 9, 1994, at 7.
10. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 43 (2d ed. 1998); see
James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 61 (It is "an essential principle" that "[i]ndividual freedom finds
tangible expression in property rights."); see also RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM, at
xiii (2d ed. 2000).
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supported empirically: It has been my observation that the fact that
there are no countries in the world where a high degree of personal
and political freedom does not correlate strongly with a similarly
high degree of economic liberty. Countries that deny their citizens
economic liberty protected by a rule of law have generally been the
ones that have inflicted misery on their people and devastation on
their environment.
Nonetheless, in today's American law we confront a legal
regime of invidiously unequal treatment of people in their capacity as
property owners, particularly-and perversely-when the govern-
ment seeks to take their property from them, whether directly by
using its power of eminent domain or indirectly through confiscatory
regulations. The reasons why this disparity of treatment exists have
not been coherently explained by the courts, possibly because no
morally and doctrinally respectable underpinnings for it can be
articulated consistently with basic morality subscribed to by the
Judeo-Christian tradition,"1 or with the values enshrined in the Bill of
Rights, or with Americans' prevailing commitment to widespread
private property ownership. 2
In today's property regulation climate it is often a myth that
property owners have their way with legislative and regulatory
bodies and need no help from the law. However true that may have
been in the past and still may be in some cases, it is manifestly
untrue in takings law where landowners seek to develop their land
for badly needed housing, only to find themselves confronted with
hostile city councils and other regulatory bodies-the California
Coastal Commission being the proverbial Exhibit A. 3
11. See Exodus 20:17 (King James) ("Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house .... ); id.
at 20:15 ("Thou shalt not steal."). Compare the moral lesson implicit in King Ahab's violent
seizure of Naboth's vineyard, 1 Kings 21:1-21 (King James), and the Lord's bloody retribution, 2
Kings 9-10 (King James), with that found in King David's insistence on paying Oman 600
shekels in gold for his land to be used as the site of the ark of the covenant, 1 Chronicles 21:18-
26 (King James).
12. Timothy Sandefur, The "Backlash" So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent
Domain Reform?, MICH. ST. L. REv. 709, 711-12 (2006).
13. See generally Michael M. Berger, You Can't Win Them All-Or Can You?, 54 CAL. ST.
B.J. 16 (1979) (commenting on California courts' all-too-evident bias in favor of the California
Coastal Commission's extreme property regulations); J. David Breemer, What Property Rights:
The California Coastal Commission 's History ofAbusing Land Rights and Some Thoughts on the
Underlying Causes, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 247, 281 n.205 (2004).
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Thus it was not surprising that the country reacted with dismay
to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New
London,14 which makes people's unoffending homes fair game for
takings, for no better reason than a local municipality's assertion that
seizing those homes and turning their sites over to more favored,
profit-seeking parties will produce higher tax revenues. The extent
and intensity of that popular reaction makes clear that in spite of
decades of "progressive" rhetoric disparaging the institution of
property, 5 right-thinking Americans overwhelmingly believe that the
right to own and enjoy one's property, particularly in the form of a
family home, is a vital attribute of their personal liberty. The Kelo
majority opinion plainly misunderstood that reality. The intensity of
Kelo's aftermath demonstrates how far beyond mainstream
American values was the Supreme Court's decision allowing the
seizure and destruction of lower-middle-class homes to facilitate
"economic redevelopment" avowedly intended to provide more
upscale facilities to a wealthier population, and making redevelopers
richer, all in the dubious hope that by a trickle-down process some of
their prosperity would rub off on the community.
Though the New London affair was egregious in effecting a
wealth transfer from the lower-middle-class to the rich, the taking
was rubber-stamped by the Court's majority as a "public benefit.
16
The Court's semantic and doctrinal confusion, equating the
constitutional term "public use" with "public purpose" and the
Court's assertion that the latter term is a "more natural" meaning of
the former17 bring to mind the bon mot of California's late Chief
Justice Roger Traynor who observed that there are "notions
[embedded in the law] that have never been cleaned and pressed and
might disintegrate if they were."18 The Supreme Court's version of
the "public benefit" element of eminent domain law fits that mold. It
disregards the plain meaning of the phrase "public use," mistreats
faultless citizens and sacrifices the public interest by facilitating
14. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
15. See Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L.
REv. 481 (1983).
16. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489-90.
17. Id. at 479-80; see Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad
Judgment, 38 URB. LAW. 201, 202-03 (2006) [hereinafter Bad Law].
18. Roger J. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CAL. L. REv. 615, 621
(1961).
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dissipation of public funds for the benefit of politically connected
private business interests. This occurs without any serious judicial
attempt at a reasoned explanation of why the power of eminent
domain should be exulted above all other government powers. No
less a paladin of the anti-property movement than Professor Joseph
L. Sax has had to concede that "[t]he majority view in Kelo may give
a green-light to bad public policy," though he maintains "it's good
constitutional law."' 9 He has offered no explanation why pursuit of
this concededly bad public policy should be placed beyond reach of
the checks and balances system inherent in American constitutional
law, nor why the power of eminent domain should be deemed so
overarching that the bases for its exercise need not even be rational,
but merely "rationally related to [the] conceivable."" °
To illustrate my point that complaints of property owners do not
receive even-handed treatment from the courts, one can do no better
(or perhaps more accurately, no worse) than to consider the
handiwork of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
reputedly a conservative court, in National Advertising Co. v. City of
Raleigh." There, a billboard company, aggrieved by an ordinance
requiring it to take down its billboards after five-and-a-half years,
sued on two theories. First, it argued that the amortization ordinance
amounted to a taking of its billboards, and second, that the ordinance
impaired the company's First Amendment rights by denying it the
ability to convey its messages to the public through the medium of
billboards.22 The court rejected both claims, but how it did so tells
volumes.
The court first held that the takings claim was barred by
limitations; it should have been filed when the ordinance was first
enacted, even though at that time the case would have been unripe
because the billboard owner had then not yet suffered any
interference with the billboards' use and hence had suffered no
damage. 3 The court thus declined to reach the merits of the takings
19. Joseph L. Sax, Kelo: A Case Rightly Decided, 28 U. HAW. L. REv. 365, 371 (2006).
20. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
21. 947 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 931 (1992).
22. Id. at 1160. See generally Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)
(plurality opinion) (holding that billboards convey speech and may not be banned).
23. Cf Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9-10, 15 (1988) (holding that a taking
challenge to a rent control ordinance was premature because, as of the filing of the lawsuit
(immediately after enactment of the ordinance), the city had not yet applied it).
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claim. But paradoxically, when it came to the First Amendment
claim, the court was born again and, without any explanation for the
disparity of treatment of the two constitutional claims, asserted that it
was doubtful whether the bar of limitations could ever be interposed
as a defense to a First Amendment claim. The court made a point of
deciding that claim on the merits. All this on the same facts of the
same case.
And therein lies a tale.
II. THE FICKLE "GRAND MUFTIS"
The invidious disparity between treatment of constitutionally
aggrieved property owners seeking judicial redress for
uncompensated takings of their property, as opposed to the treatment
of persons seeking redress for violations of other constitutional
rights, is highlighted by the behavior of federal judges. The federal
courts stand ever ready to adjudicate constitutional issues, including,
inter alia, local controversies over regulations of land whose owners
complain of impairment of their [other] federal constitutional
rights,24 notably in cases of regulations of "adult entertainment"
venues,25 group homes, 26 and religious uses of land.27 This has been
so commonplace a phenomenon that litigation of local land-use
regulations in federal courts has for years been the subject of a major
treatise.28 Thus, federal courts routinely respond on the merits to
constitutional claims concerning the use of land for performances by
nudie cuties displaying their unmentionable charms to an audience of
24. For an extensive collection of such cases, see Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner,
Shell Game! You Can't Get Therefrom Here: Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence in Takings
Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671, 693 n.102 (2004)
[hereinafter Shell Game!].
25. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Am.
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Gammoh v. City ofLa Habra, 395 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.
2005); Laredo Rd. Co. v. Maverick County, 397 F. Supp. 2d 835 (W.D. Tex. 2005).
26. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
27. See, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,
459 U.S. 116 (1982).
28. See BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION, at xiii (2005)
("Why is this treatise needed? Simply put, today, a thorough knowledge of federal land use law
has become a necessity for anyone seeking to practice in the field of land use and development
regulation.").
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beer-swilling saloon patrons ("free speech," don't you know).29 At
the same time, federal judges recoil from addressing serious
constitutional issues raised by landowners who complain of
confiscatory land-use regulations when they seek to devote their land
to construction of housing, which is ostensibly a highly favored
species of land use under federal law. 0
The worst of it is not just that this situation prevails, which
would be bad enough. Rather, it is that many federal judges dealing
with these cases become palpably hostile to the plight of the
constitutionally aggrieved property owners when asked to protect
those owners' constitutional right to use and improve their land.
With the lone, honorable exception of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in what has sometimes been referred to as the
"Great Santini case,"31 no federal judges that I am aware of have had
the courage to speak out candidly to address explicitly the prevailing
double standard of judging in takings cases and the logical and moral
anomalies with which these cases are replete.
Federal courts that freely adjudicate the constitutional aspects of
non-takings land-use regulation issues disparage regulatory takings
29. I hasten to note that I am neither prude nor censor, and that I enjoy the vistas of Tony
Soprano's silicone-augmented bimbos gyrating au naturel around firehouse poles in the "Bada-
Bing" saloon, as much as the next fellow. However, summoning all the meager intellectual
resources at my command, I do experience difficulties in understanding just how all that
commercialized titillation (no pun intended) involves speech. I am also puzzled as to why (in
contrast with judicial solicitude for the voyeurs among us) justifiable concerns about the serious
national problems of declining housing affordability contributed to by regulatory obstacles to
housing construction do not inspire similar judicial solicitude, if not on behalf of landowners then
at least on behalf of the country's growing population of housing have-nots. See Michael M.
Berger, Wet T-Shirts, Property Rights: A Constitutional Conundrum, L.A. DAILY J., May 11,
1994, at 7; John J. Delaney, Addressing the Workforce Housing Crisis in Maryland and
Throughout the Nation: Do Land Use Regulations That Preclude Reasonable Housing Oppor-
tunity Based upon Income Violate the Individual Liberties Protected by State Constitutions?, 33
U. BALT. L. REv. 153 (2004); see also Cecily Talbert, California's Response to Its Affordable
Housing Crisis, 2007 Institute on Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain, Ctr. for Am. & Int'l L.,
8-1 ("It is estimated that, on an annual basis, between 60,000 and 80,000 more housing units are
needed every year than are currently being built."); id. at 8-2.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000).
31. Compare Santini v. Conn. Hazardous Waste Mgmt. Serv., 342 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 875 (2004) ("We do not believe that the Supreme Court intended in
Williamson County to deprive all property owners in states whose takings jurisprudence generally
follows federal law (i.e., those to whom collateral estoppel would apply) of the opportunity to
bring Fifth Amendment takings claims in federal court."), with Kottschade v. City of Rochester,
319 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2003) (conceding that the prevailing state of the law is anomalous,
but instead of addressing the anomaly, chickening out and passing the buck to the Supreme Court
which denied certiorari, 540 U.S. 825 (2003)).
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claims as inappropriate efforts to get them to act as zoning "Grand
Muftis. ' 3 2  Why the federal courts have no trouble routinely
assuming the role of zoning "Grand Muftis" in cases involving local
land-use regulations of all sorts of things and activities,33 while
scorning cases of uncompensated regulatory takings or deprivations
of property without due process of law, has never been rationally
explained.34 In theory, people's rights in property are not supposed
to be the law's "poor relation," to borrow Chief Justice Rehnquist's
expression," but in reality they are treated by the federal courts as
such. Property owners are routinely denied not only even-handed
justice, but beyond that, access to courts, to present their federal
constitutional claims on the merits.
Though the philosophical antipathy to individuals asserting their
property rights on constitutional grounds raised its head as legal
doctrine in the 1930s, in the wake of a born-again judiciary's
interpretation of New Deal legislation (much of which was candidly
influenced by Marxist hostility to private rights in property), today's
anomalous remedial regime came about piecemeal in the 1980s. The
case law of that period gave no indication that the Supreme Court
32. E.g., Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. City of Carmel, 361 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004); Dodd
v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998); Hoehne v. County of San Benito,
870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d
461, 467 (7th Cir. 1988). For a particularly virulent display of unwarranted judicial nastiness
directed at relief-seeking plaintiff-property owners, see Chongris v. Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d
36 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987), denying relief to plainly deserving
property owners (who, without any basis in law, had been denied the use of their land for a lawful
business) and taunting them in the process. If you suppose that the Chongris court's sarcasm was
in any way justified, be assured it was not. Chongris gave rise to a mainstream constitutional
issue arising out of an unwarranted delay of lawful property use. Cf City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) (affirming an award of damages to owners of land whose
lawful use was temporarily prevented by local municipal regulators). See also the New York
Keystone Associates litigation, in which the state courts awarded substantial damages for a similar
legally unjustified delay in allowing a landowner to build on the site of the former Metropolitan
Opera House in New York. For a description and analysis of that controversy, see Gideon
Kanner, Measure of Damages in Nonphysical Inverse Condemnation Cases, Proceedings of the
1989 Inst. on Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain §§ 12.01, 12.02[2][f] (1989), discussing the
series of cases comprising the Keystone Associates litigation. So whatever can be rationally said
of the Chongris plaintiffs' position, it was, if not meritorious, certainly not frivolous, and it did
not justify anything like the shabby treatment they received from the court.
33. See cases collected in Shell Game!, supra note 24, at 692, 693 n.102.
34. Compare the judicial statements of principle quoted in the text accompanying infra notes
92-96. At one time it was thought that for some unexplainable reason, civil rights protected by
42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not include individual property rights, but the Supreme Court put that
erroneous belief to rest in Lynch v. Household Financial Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
35. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
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had thought through, or even understood, the interaction of its case
by case holdings in its then haphazardly evolving law of remedies in
takings cases, with the law of claim and issue preclusion. One is
justified in surmising that the Court, then unsure of its command of
regulatory inverse condemnation law, became so preoccupied with
finding excuses for deferring the day of decision on the issue of
remedies until it was more confident of its ability to decide whether
invalidation of the confiscatory regulation or just compensation was
the proper remedy in regulatory takings,36 that it simply did not
reflect on the interaction of its ad hoc holding in Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City37
with City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons.38 A
juxtaposition of these decisions suggests that the Court did not
understand the Alice-in-Wonderland problem it was creating39 until it
was confronted by it after the fact in the San Remo case." There,
despite its evident understanding of the problem it had created, the
Court chose not to address it. Instead, the Court casually conferred
on American property owners complaining of uncompensated
takings, the status of legal pariahs who, unlike other constitutionally
aggrieved plaintiffs, are barred from seeking their federal
constitutional remedy from the federal courts. They are also barred,
as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his San Remo concurrence, from
seeking a federal law remedy in any court. Of course, I could be
wrong. Perhaps the Court did understand all too well what it was
doing, in which case its San Remo decision would not only be mind-
boggling, but positively malevolent in thus excluding American
property owners as a class from the scope of the federal
36. See Robert I. McMurry, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a
Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 UCLA L. REv. 711 (1982). For an
extensive rehearsal of the pro and con arguments on this issue, compare Norman Williams, Jr. et
al., The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REv. 193 (1984), with Michael M. Berger &
Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on The White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of
Five's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
685 (1986).
37. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
38. 522 U.S. 156 (1997).
39. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
40. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005); Rockstead v.
City of Crystal Lake, 486 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2007); see J. David Breemer, You Can Check Out
But You Can Never Leave: The Story of San Remo Hotel-The Supreme Court Relegates Federal
Takings Claims to State Courts Under a Rule Intended to Ripen the Claims for Federal Review,
33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 247 (2006).
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constitutional protection that is readily enforced by the federal courts
for all other constitutionally aggrieved plaintiffs.
With regard to how this anomalous law evolved, my views are a
matter of record,4' and I see no reason to replow that much-tilled
ground again.42 Yet, because of the crudely discriminatory treatment
of property owners by the courts, those views make for an
appropriate departure point for examining other aspects of eminent
domain law for instances of similar mistreatment of property owners.
As it turns out, one need not look far; the law of eminent domain
historically has been and remains to this day replete with
inconsistencies, doctrinal anomalies, lack of judicial even-
handedness, and raw injustice.43 This article, accordingly, deals with
several selected issues in this field, without attempting to canvass the
entire subject.
III. You CAN'T GET THERE FROM HERE
It may seem a bit perverse that one taking claim (past
violations) be barred by statute of limitations because it was
delinquently filed in federal court, and yet a similar claim
(continuing violations) be barred by ripeness because it was
prematurely filed in federal court. But this is the nature of
federal-state interplay after Williamson ....
The most stark illustration of the invidiously disparate judicial
treatment of property owners arises when they seek relief for
41. Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been
Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307
(1998) (hereinafter Snark]; see also Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-
Century Retrospective on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 679 (2005) [hereinafter Laws and Sausages].
42. If there is one thing that commentators of all stripes agree on, it is that the law of
regulatory takings is an intellectual morass of confusion, inconsistency and at times outright
nonsense. Some have even characterized it as judicial fraud on the litigants.
43. When I began to write my first law review article almost forty years ago, I was struck by
the fact that legal literature was replete with strongly worded criticisms of eminent domain
decisional law, by a host of first-rank legal commentators of varying ideological perspectives.
For a collection of some of these critical expressions, see Gideon Kanner, When Is "Property"
Not "Property Itself': A Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of
Goodwill in Eminent Domain, 6 CAL. W. L. REV. 57, 58 (1969). Not much has changed in
eminent domain law since then; inverse condemnation law has grown more anomalous and the
scholarly invective directed at it justifiably more intemperate.
44. McNamara v. City of Rittman, 2007 FED App. 0004P at 6 (6th Cir.). This is reminiscent
of the Queen of Hearts informing Alice that she could have had jam on her toast yesterday, and
will be able to have it tomorrow, but never today.
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uncompensated takings of their property by suing (or more
accurately, trying to sue) for violation of their federal constitutional
rights in federal courts. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San
Francisco45 made it official: American property owners complaining
of takings of their property are not entitled to the same remedial
regime as other Americans complaining of deprivation of their other
constitutional rights. Egregiously, while these litigants have been
barred from seeking relief in federal courts, their adversaries in the
same cases enjoy free access to federal courts when they choose to
remove state court actions to federal court.46
Under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank,47 property owners' federal takings claims are
deemed unripe until after they sue in state courts and unsuccessfully
seek just compensation there first.48 Only then, holds Williamson
County, do these property owners' federal claims become ripe.
However, if they do precisely what Williamson County prescribes,
and ripen their federal claims by suing first in state courts where
relief is denied, they are told by San Remo that the state court
adjudication gives rise to claim or issue preclusion, so that their
federal claims will not be heard at all-either in state or in federal
court.49 Four concurring Justices of the Supreme Court have
expressed their puzzlement in San Remo as to why this harsh rule
should apply only to property owners and no one else." But,
inasmuch as the San Remo petitioner did not challenge the
Williamson County rule, the rule was left standing, and in a
45. 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
46. See id. at 346-47.
47. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
48. Id. at 194-95.
49. See, e.g., Rockstead v. City of Crystal City, 486 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2007) (federal court
denying relief even though no relief was available under existing state black-letter law); Rainey
Bros. Constr. Co. v. Memphis & Shelby County Bd. of Adjustment, 967 F. Supp. 998, 1005
(W.D. Tenn. 1997), aff'd without opinion, 178 F.3d 1295 (6th Cir. 1999) (federal court barring
inverse condemnation action under res judicata even though the County conceded that the owners
were treated unconstitutionally and that the state courts erroneously denied relief); see also Dodd
v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998); Manufactured Home Cmtys., Inc. v. City
of San Jose, 358 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2003). There is vast legal literature on this subject,
so this ground need not be canvassed here again. For collected citations, see Shell Game!, supra
note 24, at 693 n. 102. Note particularly the collection of scholarly invective by knowledgeable
commentators on both sides of the issue, directed at the Supreme Court's handiwork, ranging
from "inherently nonsensical" to "a fraud or hoax on landowners." Id. at 702-03.
50. San Remo, 545 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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subsequent case that did raise this issue the Court denied certiorari,
leaving the pertinent law in its concededly anomalous condition."
None of the Justices who had criticized Williamson County in the
San Remo case voted in favor of granting certiorari in Kottschade,
thus forgoing the opportunity to address this judicially conceded
anomaly in the law, and raising the question as to whether they really
understood the problem, and if so, whether they meant to acquiesce
to it.
Nor is that all. There are two wrinkles to this rule that make this
legal regime even worse. First, under City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes,52 property owners who seek compensation for regulatory
takings by suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) are entitled to trial
by jury on the issue of liability, at least to the extent their case
presents fact-bound questions (which land use cases usually do).53
However, state courts do not provide trials by jury on the issue of
inverse condemnation liability,54 so that the aggrieved owners can
never obtain the trial by jury that is ostensibly their right under
federal law. By the time they complete litigation in state courts and
are theoretically able to assert for the first time a ripe federal
constitutional claim to be resolved by a jury trial, their case is said to
be barred by the state court judgment at the precise moment that it
becomes ripe. As Professor Roberts put it: "An unripe [takings] suit
is barred at the moment it comes into existence. Like a tomato that
suffers vine rot, it goes from being green to mushy red overnight. It
is never able to be eaten."55 Therefore, in spite of the explicit Del
Monte Dunes black-letter holding establishing a right to a trial by
jury under § 1983 on the issue of liability,56 the aggrieved
landowners cannot avail themselves of it.
51. See supra note 5; see also Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 825 (2003).
52. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
53. Id. at 721-22.
54. See, e.g., Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Town of Groton, 808 A.2d 1107, 1127 (Conn.
2002). Note that on this point state law is dispositive because the Seventh Amendment applies
only to the federal government and is not binding on the states. See Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S.
90, 92 (1875).
55. Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment Takings
Litigation, J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L., Summer 1997, at 71, 75.
56. 526 U.S. at 721-22 (1999).
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Second, adding insult to injury, unlike plaintiffs claiming an
uncompensated taking of their property, municipal defendants in
such cases are not bound by the Williamson County rule, and may
freely litigate in federal court in the first instance, if they so choose,
simply by removing the action to federal court when the owners,
acting in obedience to Williamson County, file their inverse
condemnation action in state court.57 The absurd result is that federal
courts may not entertain these cases for lack of ripeness (and hence
lack of jurisdiction) when property owners sue, but simultaneously
they do have jurisdiction and can entertain them when the defendants
transfer the case there under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The self-stultifying
"explanation" (if that word may be used here without doing violence
to the English language) provided by the Supreme Court in Surgeons
is that such cases may be transferred from state to federal court
because the plaintiff-property owners could have filed the action in
federal court in the first instance58 even though under Williamson
County, the plaintiffs could not do so, thus making the Surgeons
''explanation" simply irrational.
This absurd judicial reasoning has led to a legal regime in
which, as required by Williamson County, aggrieved property owners
who are denied access to the federal forum duly file their takings
cases in state courts only to have the government defendants remove
them to federal courts, and once there, argue that the federal courts
lack jurisdiction (on account of lack of ripeness) and that the cases
must therefore be dismissed because the plaintiffs should have sued
in state court first (which of course they did, or at least tried to do
until the defendants removed the case unilaterally to federal court).
Actually, even on this Alice in Wonderland premise, once the federal
courts agree that they lack jurisdiction for lack of ripeness, such
removed cases should be remanded to state court, and some of them
are. But many others are dismissed by the federal courts. 9 Even
worse, some federal courts acknowledge lack of ripeness and, hence,
57. City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163-64 (1997); see Shell
Game!, supra note 24, at 673, 676-77.
58. Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 164.
59. See, e.g., Palomar Mobilehome Park Ass'n v. City of San Marcos, 989 F2d 362, 364-65
(9th Cir. 1993); Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725, 726-29 (3d Cir. 1989).
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of jurisdiction, but then go on to make substantive rulings on the
merits against the plaintiffs anyway.6"
No other species of American plaintiffs are subjected to such
judicial jiggery-pokery. Indeed, even convicted criminals who fail to
exhaust their state court post-conviction remedies, as they are
required to do before seeking habeas corpus in federal courts, are
treated better. Unlike property owners, when convicted criminals'
claims are based on federal constitutional law and the state courts
deny relief, they are free to sue for habeas corpus in federal courts,
with no res judicata effect arising from their prior state court action.
Even when they fail to exhaust their state remedies first, they may
still receive federal court relief."
This is a poorly understood situation, even in the legal
profession at large, as evidenced by the steady stream of actions for
uncompensated takings being filed directly in the federal courts that
find them to be unripe and dismiss them. I surmise that large
numbers of Americans, as well as their lawyers, simply cannot bring
themselves to believe that aggrieved property owners who seek
vindication of their federal constitutional rights have been cast out by
the courts into some sort of outer darkness as far as their federal
constitutional rights are concerned. This is a civically corrosive
problem. Being told that, unlike other plaintiffs, faultless property
owners have no enforceable federal rights under the U.S.
Constitution is certain to erode public confidence in the courts and to
bring them into deserved public disrepute.
Our justice system works, to the extent that it works,
because people have confidence in it. Not just confidence
that it reaches the right result (though that is important), but
also confidence that everyone gets a fair hearing before a
fair judge, and that the process itself is neither rigged nor
weighed. In other words, people place their trust in judging
that is truly independent ... of both outside influence and
dispositive predisposition.62
Alas, the current state of inverse condemnation law falls short of
these admirable criteria.
60. See, e.g., McNamara v. City of Rittman, 2007 FED App. 0004P (6th Cir.).
61. See Smith v. Baldwin, 466 F.3d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 2006).
62. Steven Lubet, Judicial Conduct: Speech and Consequences, 4 LONG TERM VIEW 71, 75
(1997).
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IV. WHAT'S YOURS, ISN'T
On the subject of the right to take private property for public
use, little need be said. The recent Supreme Court decision in Kelo
v. City of New London63 makes clear that property owners' ostensible
constitutional right not to have their homes taken by eminent
domain, except for public uses, is not treated seriously by the Court.
Instead, that right is seen by the Court's majority, not as the weighty
constitutional guarantee that it is, but rather as an annoying
impediment to local governance-something to be brushed aside
before yielding the constitutional question of whether the taking is
indeed for "public use" to condemnors' do-it-yourself "legislative"
powers64 that, in fact, are not subject to meaningful constitutional
review by the Court. The message embedded in the all too evident
subtext of this Supreme Court decisional law is to tell the
condemnors, "Do what you want, and don't worry about the
Constitution."
Elsewhere in the law, though the courts may apply varying
degrees of deference to the legislatures whose enactments are
brought to them for review, they do review the constitutionally
challenged legislation or government policy on some level, as is their
prerogative and duty under Marbury v. Madison.65 Indeed, in other
cases, courts stress that judicial review of government activities is
particularly appropriate where the government purpose is benign,
thus creating a temptation to advance it at the cost of individual
rights.66 But in eminent domain cases, the mighty U.S. Supreme
Court stands this judicial policy on its head and proclaims itself to be
63. 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005) (holding that private property may be taken for "economic
redevelopment," not to create any public works or eliminate social harms, but simply t6 be turned
over gratis to private developers who hope to make lots of money, some of which will hopefully
trickle down to the community). For my commentaries on Kelo, see Gideon Kanner, The Public
Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or "Hortatory Fluff'?, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 335 (2006), Bad
Law, supra note 17, and Gideon Kanner, We Don't Have to Follow Any Stinkin ' Planning-Sorry
About that Justice Stevens, 39 Urb. Law. 529 (2007).
64. I use quotation marks because, in contrast with enabling legislation articulating
categories of public uses authorizing eminent domain actions, actual decisions to condemn a
particular property for a particular use are in fact made by bodies that are not legislative (e.g.,
state highway commissions and turnpike authorities, as well as flood control districts and similar
subordinate administrative bodies comprised of unelected government functionaries).
65. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).
66. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (stressing the need to observe
individual constitutional rights, particularly as against demands of "praiseworthy government
officials" concerned with efficiency).
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putty in the hands of local municipalities. It holds that it can only
rubber-stamp whatever any one-horse burg or, worse, its unelected
redevelopment agency, decides to call "public use." The Court
deems such decisions to condemn to be "well-nigh conclusive,"67
unless a decision not only fails the rationality test but, beyond that, is
so far out that it is not even rationally related to the conceivable.68
67. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); see Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488-89 (stressing the
Court's assertedly limited authority and its inability to overrule a condemning body's finding of
public use).
68. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984). No one, to the best of my
knowledge, has ever explained what proposed land uses (other than criminal activities) could not
be said to be rationally related to some conceivable public benefit, and-more important from a
lawyer's point of view-what evidence one would have to put on to demonstrate to a court's
satisfaction that the proposed use is not rationally related to the conceivable, or that its objective
is inconceivable. For, as countless science fiction writers have demonstrated, anything-anything
at all-is conceivable.
In my post-Midkiff lectures, I have been using as an example of the absurdity inherent in
this judicial formulation a hypothetical taking for senior housing for elderly Martians living
among us. Would that pass muster as a "public use"? Hyperbole, you say? Be careful. In a
prime example of Oscar Wilde's dictum that life imitates art, I offer for your consideration the
pertinent part of the transcript of an oral argument before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. There, the U.S. Justice Department asserted that, if Congress were to enact laws for the
benefit of unseen and undetected "space aliens" among us, the courts would have no alternative
but to approve it as consistent with the Constitution:
JUDGE FLETCHER: Can I get at your definition of "conceivable?" To take an outer-
boundary sort of example ....
MR. YELLIN: Sure.
JUDGE FLETCHER: . . . not related to this case. Is it conceivable that space aliens
are visiting this planet in invisible and undetectable craft?
MR. YELLIN: Is it conceivable?
JUDGE FLETCHER: That's my question.
MR. YELLIN: Yes, it's conceivable.
JUDGE FLETCHER: And that would be a basis for sustaining Congressional
legislation, if... the person sponsoring the bill said, "Space aliens are visiting us in
invisible and undetectable craft, and that's the basis for my legislation," we can't
touch it?
MR. YELLIN: If Congress made a finding of that sort?
JUDGE FLETCHER: That's my question.
MR. YELLIN: Your Honor, I think if Congress made a finding of that sort, I think,
Your Honor, it would not be appropriate for this Court to second guess that.
JUDGE FLETCHER: Okay, in other words, "conceivable" is "any piece of nonsense is
enough."
MR. YELLIN: Your Honor, I don't think .... It is largely unbounded. It is not
completely unbounded. There are the outlying-
JUDGE FLETCHER: How can you say it's not completely unbounded when you
agreed with my absolutely preposterous example of what's conceivable?
Audio Recording of Oral Argument, Alaska Cent. Express, Inc. v. United States, 145 F. App'x
211 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-35902) (questions by Judge William Fletcher; answers by Lewis
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This is a standard that the Court, to the best of my knowledge, has
never explained and whose violation it has never encountered in the
past century, thus taking a page from Will Rogers, who once said
that he never met a man he did not like.69 Apart from its vagueness,
its unmanageable breadth, and its encouragement of constitutional
overreaching, the fundamental deficiency of that absurd non-standard
of review is that it looks only to the prognosticated benefits
foreshadowed by the redevelopment project's self-promoting
sponsors. Yet, in disregard of the verity that there is no such thing as
a free lunch, it studiously ignores the detriments certain to be caused
as well by such projects, such as the trauma of mass displacements of
urban populations, to take an obvious example. Nor is there any
inquiry into whether or not the proposed project is even capable of
being constructed or of producing the benefits ascribed to it.7"
Moreover, this standard creates a virtually insurmountable
obstacle in the path of property owners seeking to demonstrate that a
municipal finding of "public use" is in fact unwarranted, or perhaps
that the net effect of the project (after both its net impact and
demonstrable externalities are taken into account) may be negative
and thus not a benefit at all. This standard permits judicial
conjecture about matters said to support the decision to take, that the
governing body of the condemnor-city has never considered and
perhaps would never accept, were they presented to it. Thus, under
this standard, the Court "reviews" not the decision to condemn that is
on the record before it, but rather some nonexistent fictional
"decision" that the condemning body might have but never did make,
Yellin, U.S. Dept. of Justice). In what must have been a tour deforce of self-restraint (at least I
hope so), Judge Fletcher and his colleagues refrained from sharing this fascinating government
position with the readers of their opinion, even as they ruled in the government's favor on
grounds unrelated to E.T.'s invisible cousin's visit to Earth.
69. Will Rogers obviously did not move in my circles and was innocent of knowing some of
the condemning agency functionaries that it has been my misfortune to run into in my forty years
of practicing eminent domain law. See Gideon Kanner, Welcome Home Rambo: High-Minded
Ethics and Low-Down Tactics in the Courts, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 81, 84 n.13, 85 n.16, 86 n.22,
89 n.40 (1991); see also Gideon Kanner, Sic Transit Gloria: The Rise and Fall of Mutuality of
Discovery in California Eminent Domain Litigation, 6 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 447, 460-67 (1973)
[hereinafter Sic Transit Gloria].
70. See Thomas J. Posey, This Land Is My Land: The Need for a Feasibility Test in
Evaluation of Takings for Public Necessity, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1403, 1404-05 (2003)
(discussing cases in which courts permitted condemnations to proceed even where it was clear or
undisputed that the proposed projects could not be built for lack of funds or even for legal
reasons).
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thereby substituting unarticulated, possibly unrealistic judicial
fantasy for palpable reality.7 Since Supreme Court Justices can be
presumed to be smarter and less constrained in their thinking by
realities of municipal power politics than local politicians, this
approach also means that the Justices are free to conjure up
rationales for "public" benefits that the local municipal functionaries
may not be able to imagine.
In contrast with this extreme laissez-faire judicial attitude in
eminent domain cases, in other areas of the law the Court takes a dim
view of legislative efforts to determine the substantive meaning of
constitutional terms.72 But when it comes to determining the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment phrase "public use," it surrenders
its incontestably available authority to do so to municipal politicians
and unelected redevelopment agency functionaries, who, urban
political reality being what it is, may be under the thumb of well-
connected, politically powerful private interests out to make a buck
at the expense of condemnees and of the public fisc. 73 The process of
constitutional review thus becomes a do-it-yourself imprimatur for
the project's proponents, as well as an invitation to municipal
corruption.74
71. Though not involving public use, the Court provided us with an excellent example of
using erroneous judicial suppositions as a substitute for land-use realities in Tahoe-Sierra
Presentation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 354 (2002), where
it misunderstood the use of moratoria as a land-use planning tool. See David L. Callies, Kelo v.
City of New London: Of Planning, Federalism, and a Switch in Time, 28 U. HAW. L. REv. 327,
347 (2006) (commenting on the Court's evident lack of understanding of how moratoria are
legitimately used in the planning process); see also Snark, supra note 41, at 337-41 (discussing
the Court's evident lack of understanding of variances and other land use rules and practices).
72. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (holding that a
congressional attempt to define the substantive meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment was
invalid in the context of land use).
73. In Los Angeles, 73.6 percent of the funds disbursed by the city's Community
Redevelopment Agency to redevelopers have gone to 10 percent of the redevelopers. Patrick
McGreevy, Audit Targets Redevelopment Agency, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2006, at B4. For a vivid
example of a redeveloper dictating to a city to such an extent as to be considered a proverbial
"800-pound gorilla" by city functionaries, see 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment
Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001). See also In re Condemnation of 110
Wash. St., 767 A.2d 1154, 1160 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (noting that redevelopment agreement
with the city, as is often done, granted the redeveloper the power to dictate to the city whether
eminent domain should be used, and if so, when).
74. See Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 605 F. Supp. 612, 618
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), afj'd, 771 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1985) (refusing to consider on the merits the
owners' charge that the redevelopment project was corruptly drawn to enrich Mayor's friends).
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In other areas of the law the Court has it that, where government
acts in its own financial self-interest, its contested acts are properly
subject to heightened judicial review.75 On the other hand, in
"commercial redevelopment" cases such as Kelo, where government
financial self-interest was concededly the engine that drove the
redevelopment process, the Court was content to let the local,
revenue-hungry municipality and its private sector, profit-seeking
partners call the constitutional tune, despite their manifest conflict of
interest. Moreover, while conventional wisdom has it that this sort
of judicial review-or perhaps more accurately, judicial non-
review-is justified because the aggrieved citizen's proper remedy is
to appeal to the legislative bodies that are said to exercise the power
of eminent domain, in fact, the decision to condemn and if so, which
property and to what extent, is made not by democratically
responsive legislatures, but by unelected local agencies or
unresponsive corporations that are created for the purpose of
acquiring land by eminent domain.
V. WE DON'T HAVE TO SHOW You ANY STINKIN' DUE PROCESS
Broadly speaking, the United States may take property
pursuant to its power of eminent domain in one of two ways:
It can enter into physical possession of property without
authority of a court order; or it can institute condemnation
proceedings under various Acts of Congress providing
authority for such takings. Under the first method-
physical seizure-no condemnation proceedings are
instituted .... 76
Why the federal courts should so casually approve of denial of
due process of law in property takings cases, the Supreme Court has
never even tried to explain.77 Procedural due process, in many ways
75. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 978 n.9 (1991) ("[lIt makes sense to scrutinize
governmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit."); see U.S. Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1977).
76. Stringer v. United States, 471 F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
77. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 523 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Whether you agree with Justice Thomas' substantive views or not, he was on target when he
noted that the law of eminent domain developed "with little discussion of the [Taking] Clause's
history and original meaning." Id. at 514; see Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in
Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63, 105 (one
of the country's first-rank scholars concluding, after a thorough analysis of the decisional law in
this field, that the Court's efforts have been a failure); see also Bad Law, supra note 17, at 216-
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the holy of holies in American constitutional law,7" occupies at best a
tenuous role in eminent domain law and may be freely ignored by the
condemning bodies. When an action in eminent domain is actually
filed, there is a judicially enforced requirement of giving proper
notice to the condemnees,79 but that may not be a meaningful
safeguard.
In reality, the government is not obliged to bring a
condemnation action at all and need not observe any procedural
niceties. In United States v. Dow,"0 the U.S. Supreme Court stated
that property may be taken by the government by physical seizure."
Federal courts of appeal have opined that the government is free to
seize private property and say to the dispossessed owner "sue me."
In haec verba" Also, Congress can engage in legislative
expropriation by simply passing a bill transferring title to a specified
18, 222-24 (commenting on the anomalies in the doctrinal development of eminent domain law,
and on the Court's misreading of precedents).
78. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) ("The right to
prior notice and a hearing is central to the Constitution's command of due process.").
79. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); City of Walker v. Hutchinson, 352
U.S. 112, 115 (1956); see Brody v. Vill. of Port Chester, 345 F.3d 103, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003)
(stating that notice of an impending condemnation must be meaningful and calculated to put the
owner on actual notice).
80. 357 U.S. 17 (1958).
81. Id. at21.
82. See Stringer v. United States, 471 F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1973), and United States v.
Herrero, 416 F.2d 945, 947 (9th Cir. 1969), both holding explicitly that the federal government
can just seize private property and say to its owners "sue me."
In eminent domain actions, by a process known as prejudgment possession, sometimes
referred to as "quick take," the law allows condemnors to obtain ex parte court orders of pre-
judgment possession with neither notice to the condemnees nor an opportunity for then to be
heard until after the fact. See 40 U.S.C. § 3114 (2000); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.410(a)
(West 2007), amended by 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. Page No. 3767-74 (West). Compare the
Supreme Court's disapproval of procedures limiting judicial review in this after-the-fact fashion
in non-eminent-domain cases. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
For an egregious example of abuse of such ex parte procedure, see Rhode Island
Economic Development Corp. v. Parking Co., 892 A.2d 87, 94, 98 (R.I. 2006) (holding that the
condemnees were not entitled to notice and hearing before a court ordered their property
condemned and transferred prejudgment possession to the condemnor, in spite of the fact that the
condemnor took advantage of the ex parte nature of these proceedings to withhold essential
information from the trial court). Compare that with a non-condemnation case, United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (explaining that a person guilty of
drug possession and whose property was therefore subject to forfeiture was, nonetheless, entitled
to pre-deprivation notice and hearing). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972)
(holding, in a replevin action, that legal owners of the property in question are not entitled to an
ex parte order granting them prejudgment possession of their own property pending the outcome
of the case, because that would deny due process of law to the property's possessor).
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tract of land from its rightful owners to the government, relegating
them to hiring lawyers and appraisers and becoming plaintiffs in
lawsuits for compensation in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims3-a
process which can consume years before payment is actually made.
While the method of property acquisition by physical seizure may
have made sense as a matter of necessity in the nineteenth century
when the U.S. Cavalry roamed the remote reaches of the Wild West
and had to requisition mounts, fodder and provisions from local
ranchers, it makes no sense in today's world. These days, the
suggestion that absent a showing of great urgency, federal
functionaries are free to ride over the crest of a hill and, like the
Tsar's Cossacks of yore, forcibly seize privately owned land for
government uses, telling the dispossessed owners that "some day
your price will come," is repugnant to today's prevailing moral and
civic values, and is at war with even the most rudimentary notions of
due process. Nonetheless, this attitude on the part of the Court
persists84 despite the fact that the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act
of 1971 ostensibly requires federal agencies to institute eminent
domain proceedings to acquire the private property they covet, and
forbids government conduct that compels the aggrieved property
owners to sue for compensation.85
Nor is it an acceptable justification to argue that eminent domain
is different from other governmental actions," in that it implicates
83. Congress used this method of land acquisition to create the Redwood National Park in
California. See JACQUES B. GELIN & DAVID W. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 6 n.ll (Stephen R. Saltzburg & Kenneth R. Redden eds., 1982). More recently it was
used to create the Manassas Battlefield Monument in Virginia.
84. In spite of the enactment of the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act ("URA") of 1971, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (2000 & Supp. 2004), ostensibly forbidding the practice of taking first and
paying later, id. § 4651(8), the Supreme Court takes the position that it has not "ever recognized
any interest served by pretaking compensation that could not be equally well served by post-
taking compensation." Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 195 n.14 (1985). Just what the displaced owners, deprived of both their property and their
compensation, are supposed to do until their litigation is over (a process that can take years) the
Court did not deign to explain.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 4651(8). Note that Stringer v. United States, 471 F.2d 381, was decided two
years after the enactment of the URA, but the Stringer court did not deign to take note of this
statutory provision, much less enforce it. Another court held that the URA does not afford
condemnees any right to a due process hearing before the taking of their property. United States
v. 131.68 Acres of Land, 695 F.2d 872, 876 (5th Cir. 1983).
86. See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 192 (1959) ("Surely
eminent domain is no more mystically involved with 'sovereign prerogative' than a State's power
to regulate fishing in its waters, its power to regulate intrastate trucking rates, a city's power to
issue certain bonds without a referendum, its power to license motor vehicles, and a host of other
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constitutional guarantees of the Eminent Domain Clause as opposed
to the Due Process Clause. The Eminent Domain Clause only
provides substantive takings criteria ("public use" and "just
compensation") while its procedural aspects are [in theory] subject to
the Due Process Clause, as evidenced by cases such as Schroeder v.
City of New York87 and Walker v. City of Hutchinson.8" As the Court
put it in James Daniel Good, "[C]ertain wrongs affect more than a
single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the
Constitution's commands."89  The fact that the government is
permitted to pursue the substantive ends of condemning private
property for public use should not excuse it from observing the
constitutionally and statutorily required due process procedures for
doing so. Nor should it matter that in most condemnation cases the
government is entitled to proceed with the taking. In the James
Daniel Good case the Supreme Court rejected that very argument
(that Good had already been found guilty of drug possession and the
government was thus clearly entitled to pursue forfeiture of his
property with or without notice), saying "[flair procedures are not
confined to the innocent. The question before us is the legality of the
seizure, not the strength of the Government's case."9
So here, once again we confront a line of judicial authority
holding that unlike other litigants, condemnees are not entitled to the
same fair treatment that is deemed to be a constitutional minimum in
the case of other litigants who are being deprived of ownership or
lawful possession of property. Unlike other cases implicating
transfer of private property from its owners or lawful possessors to
others, the government in its capacity as a taker may simply seize the
subject land without due process and tell its rightful owners "sue
me," thereby inviting them to engage in years of litigation to receive
what is ostensibly their indisputable constitutional due. This can
occur even though under the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act the
governmental activities carried on by the States and their subdivisions which have been brought
into question in the Federal District Courts despite suggestions that those courts should have
stayed their hand pending prior state court determination of state law." (citations omitted)).
87. 371 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1962) (holding that, when a condemnation action is filed,
personal notice must be given to the property owner).
88. 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956) (same).
89. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 49 (1993) (citation
omitted).
90. Id. at 62.
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government is supposed to offer to purchase the property and initiate
eminent domain litigation before its seizure, so that the owner should
not have to sue to receive their due.
VI. FAIRNESS BE DAMNED-IT'S ALL ABOUT MONEY
A. "Fairness and Equity" and All That Jazz
The ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial
function, and no power exists in any other department of the
government to declare what the compensation shall be or to
prescribe any binding rule in that regard.9'
When it comes to interpretation of the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court changes policies,
and as noted in the above quotation, stresses that it is the courts, not
legislatures, that have the sole authority to determine compensation
and formulate rules of compensability, and indeed that no power
exists in the other two branches of government to do so. Ostensibly
laying down the judicial policy against which specific
compensability rules are to be measured, the Court tells us that as a
matter of constitutional principle, eminent domain law is a reflection
of "political ethics,"92 an embodiment of fairness and equity;93 that
"just compensation" must put condemnees in the same position
pecuniarily they would be in had their property not been taken,94 i.e.,
that indemnity is the standard of "just compensation"; and that it is
the deprivation of the owners, not the gain to the taker, that
constitutes the compensable taking.95 But specific judge-made rules
of compensation routinely contradict these principles and fail to
91. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343 (1923); see also Seaboard
Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923); Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893) (holding that Congress may not constitutionally fix just
compensation in eminent domain cases). Of course, when the Court thus spoke of judicial
supremacy in determining compensation, it spoke of the constitutionally required minimum
arrived via judicial interpretation of the constitutional term "just compensation." Legislatures are
free to provide more generous compensation than the constitutional minimum. Joslin Mfg. Co. v.
City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 676-77 (1923). Legislatures are also free to adopt stricter
"public use" criteria than those created by the federal Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme
Court. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005).
92. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949).
93. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950).
94. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
95. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
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provide indemnity to condemnees for a variety of their demonstrable
and usually undisputed economic losses. In a notable example of
circular reasoning, the Court explained that "[o]nly in the sense that
he is to receive such [market] value is it true that the owner must be
put in as good position pecuniarily as if his property had not been
taken. "96
Thus, after the benign-sounding judicial rhetoric is done with
and the Court gets down to business, it tells us that the ostensibly fair
and just compensability law of its making is actually "harsh;" that
although the courts are supreme in formulating rules of
compensability, it is up to condemnation's victims to supplicate the
legislature for relief from the harsh, judge-made law as a matter of
legislative grace; 97 that the true standard of compensation is not
indemnity, but rather fair market value so artfully defined as to
exclude factors that sellers and buyers in voluntary transactions
would consider;98 and that the government need pay only for what it
acquires, not for what the owner has lost.99 Thus, in spite of the
flowery language in court opinions, expounding ideas of fairness,
justice and indemnity said to be the constitutional due of property
owners whose property is taken, it turns out that American
condemnees are harshly treated and routinely undercompensated.' °°
96. Id. at 379.
97. Id. at 382.
98. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6 (1949); Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. at
379.
99. United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 282-83 (1943);
Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 346 (1925).
100. See Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental
Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 63 n.8 (1957). The U.S. Supreme Court has conceded that its benign
expressions are more in the nature of moral window dressing than legal doctrine:
"In giving content to the just compensation requirement of the Fifth Amendment,
this Court has sought to put the owner of condemned property 'in as good a position
pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.' However, this principle of indem-
nity has not been given its full and literal force."
United States v. 564.54 Acres, 441 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1979) (citation omitted). Why not? The
Court certainly had no difficulty giving its perceived notion of "fairness" full force and effect
when it applied it in favor of the government, allowing it to pay less for the taken property than
what the market would. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973).
The California Supreme Court has been even more explicit, putting its sincerity into
question by dismissing its own exhortations of fairness in eminent domain cases as mere
"panoramic" expressions, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Ortiz, 490 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Cal. 1971),
that when relied on by condemnees only reveal their "fundamental misunderstanding" of eminent
domain law. Cmty. Redev. Agency v. Abrams, 543 P.2d 905, 909 (Cal. 1975).
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My observation has been that when a judge starts talking about
"fairness and justice" and all that jazz, it is a reasonably safe bet that
the ruling he or she is about to make will likely turn out to favor the
government and be prejudicial to the property owner's vital
interests. 1 ' A judge once actually said to me, "I know this is very
unjust to your client, counsel, but that's just compensation."'0 2
An example of such intellectual and moral judicial bobbing and
weaving was provided by the California Supreme Court's handiwork
dealing with the well-nigh universally condemned but nonetheless
durable judge-made rule denying compensation for the loss of
business goodwill that occurs when a condemnation destroys
business premises and the business operator is unable to relocate. 3
In Abrams, the court recognized the incompatibility of its decisional
law with modern urban reality and constitutional policy,"°4 but
disclaimed any ability to rectify its own concededly unjust precedent
denying compensation for business goodwill lost by condemnees. It
offered "considerations of institutional competence" as an excuse.0 5
This from the court that at the time prided itself on, and was widely
regarded as the nation's leading activist court, that was ever ready to
change prevailing rules of law in the name of fairness.
Needless to say, in other fields of law California courts sing an
altogether different tune.0 6 The most famous, or most notorious case
101. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Land Situated in the City of Detroit, 2006 FED App.
0193P at 9 (6th Cir.) (paying lip service to the indemnity principle, in litigation pending since
1980, but departing from the vaunted "fair market value" standard when awarding interest and
allowing only $12,873,452 based on the statutory weekly average one-year treasury paper as
opposed to the $40,732,947 that would have been yielded by marketable bonds, thus
shortchanging the condemnee by $27,499,495).
102. As a matter of historical interest, the U.S. Supreme Court said something quite similar
when in Joslin Manufacturing Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1923), it evidently
overlooked the fact that it was construing the law of 'just compensation," and explained that for
condemnees to seek relief from the legislature was appropriate because it is not unlawful to make
an unjust law just, thus unwittingly conceding that its decisional law of just compensation is
unjust. See id. at 676-77.
103. See Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, 46 S.C. L.
REV. 579, 582-83 (1995); Lynda J. Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging
Factors in the Just Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. REv. 283 (1991); D. Michael Risinger,
Direct Damages: The Lost Key to Constitutional Just Compensation When Business Premises Are
Condemned, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 483, 489 (1985).
104. Cmty. Redev. Agency v. Abrams, 543 P.2d 905, 914, 918 (Cal. 1975).
105. Id. at 916.
106. E.g., Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752 (Ct. App. 1969) ("The law
should be based on current concepts of what is right and just and the judiciary should be alert to
the never-ending need for keeping legal principles abreast of the times. Ancient distinctions that
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of that kind, depending on one's perspective, was People v.
Anderson,"°7 where the California Supreme Court struck down the
death penalty as cruel and unusual, declaring it to be its "mandate of
the most imperative nature" to change prevailing rules of law when
faced with social changes, and to bring the law into conformance
with "contemporary standards of decency."'' 8 As it happened, for all
the brave judicial talk about acting in tune with changing social
conditions and standards, the Anderson court completely
misperceived the prevailing mainstream values of California society
to which it looked for inspiration. Rather, it was simply acting in
harmony with the ideological predilections of its members. Its
handiwork in Anderson was promptly repealed by the people by
initiative.' 9 Eventually, the chief justice and two associate justices
of the California Supreme Court were denied retention on the court
in the election of 1986, precisely because they were widely perceived
as being soft on the death penalty. The court never took the trouble
to explain why it should feel such an imperative duty toward duly
convicted murderers but not toward ordinary, law-abiding citizens
facing uncompensated destruction of their life's work,"' even though
in Abrams, the court was explicit in voicing its recognition and
make no sense in today's society and that tend to discredit the law should be readily
rejected .. "). Indeed, roughly at the time the California Supreme Court proclaimed itself
unable to rectify an outdated and unjust compensability rule in Abrams, Associate Justice Mathew
0. Tobriner wrote an article calling for a "social revolution" no less, to be worked by the courts at
the behest of "young lawyers." No concerns about "institutional competence" there, in spite of
the fact that young lawyers of that era tended to be more conspicuously qualified as
Feinschmeckers of mind-altering substances rather than accomplished social engineers, and the
revolution they were engaged in at the time was the sexual revolution. Mathew 0. Tobriner, Can
Young Lawyers Reform Society Through the Courts?, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 294, 298 (1972).
107. 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
108. Id. at 887, 891.
109. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27.
110. In California, as elsewhere, business goodwill is incontestably deemed to be property.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14102 (West 1987); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 655 (West 1982). Before
the legislature made loss of goodwill compensable in eminent domain under some circumstances,
the court got around that inconvenient statutory scheme by simply asserting that business
goodwill, though incontestably property, is not "the form of property" that is protected by the
Constitution in eminent domain, implicitly suggesting that property, sort of like ice cream, comes
in different flavors, some more and others less appealing to the courts. Significantly, the
California Supreme Court never provided a doctrinal framework for identifying such different
"forms" of property and never found goodwill to be the form of property that is not subject to
taxation. Abrams, 543 P.2d at 909.
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understanding of changed urban conditions that rendered its
preexisting law inconsistent with modem constitutional policy."'
Even in the paradigmatic, ordinary direct condemnation case,
where the taking is conceded and so is entitlement to "just
compensation," and where the condemnees recover at trial the full
amount claimed by them under prevailing compensability rules, they
remain inherently undercompensated. This is so because (a) the
constitutionally mandated "just" compensation is judicially defined
primarily as fair market value, in such a way that it excludes factors
that individual sellers and buyers in a voluntary market transaction
would consider;"' (b) the judicially formulated measure of
compensation inherently excludes a variety of incidental losses
suffered by condemnees;" 3 and (c) out of the award, the condemnees
must pay for their litigation expenses,"1 4 including fees of their
appraisers, lawyers, engineers, land-use and environmental
consultants, aerial photographers, as well as more esoteric experts
(e.g., experts on the economics of service stations, hotels, etc. whose
opinions are at times indispensable to the proper presentation of a
valuation case). 15 All this translates into the verity that, as Professor
Merrill put it, "The most striking feature of American compensation
law-even in the context of formal condemnation or expropriation-
111. See Abrams, 543 P.2d at 914 (noting expressly that the use of eminent domain under
modem urban conditions, particularly in redevelopment cases, "require[s] the affected parties to
bear a disproportionate share of the true cost of the public undertaking"). But see Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (explaining that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment's Just
Compensation Clause is to prevent the government from forcing individuals to bear
disproportionate burdens of public property acquisitions).
112. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6 (1949); United States v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378-79 (1945).
113. See generally GELIN & MILLER, supra note 83, at 67-85 (discussing at length the
various economic losses suffered by condemnees but judicially deemed noncompensable); James
Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV.
1277 (1985); Emerson G. Spies & John C. McCoid, II, Recovery of Consequential Damages in
Eminent Domain, 48 VA. L. REv. 437 (1962); Comment, supra note 100.
114. United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 204 (1979) (holding summarily that
condemnees are not entitled to recover litigation expenses). But see W. Harold Bigham, "Fair
Market Value," "Just Compensation, " and the Constitution: A Critical View, 24 VAND. L. REV.
63, 77 (1970) (noting that because of condemnors' common practice of offering less than their
own appraisals indicate, landowners are "forced to pay a sizeable attorney's fee to obtain
compensation to which even the condemning agency admits they are entitled").
115. See California ex rel. State Pub. Works Bd. v. Wherity, 79 Cal. Rptr. 591, 596 (Ct. App.
1969) (approving the use of planners as expert witnesses in condemnation cases).
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is that just compensation means incomplete compensation.""' 6
Another commentator juxtaposed the misleadingly benign judicial
rhetoric with courtroom reality, and concluded:
Not untypically, however, the broad sweeping language is
generally contradicted by the actual results of the [judicial]
decisions. Despite its origin in principles of natural justice,
despite the declared object of making the victim whole,
despite the generally broad understanding of the term "just
compensation" itself-it is clear that only a bare minimum
of the effects of a taking become the subject matter of
financial awards."
7
This is hardly news. Professor Scheiber assessed the practices of
American courts in nineteenth-century eminent domain cases in
strikingly similar language:
Even while the courts were propounding doctrines that
theoretically limited state eminent domain powers,
affording private property owners protection against
arbitrary state action, judges were in fact lending sanction
to the systematic extraction of involuntary subsidies from
persons on whom the costs of so-called "public" enterprises
fortuitously first fell."'8
Today's robber barons tend to build privately owned downtown
office buildings, shopping centers, automobile plants and
dealerships, and gambling casinos rather than railroads. For all the
insincere judicial exhortations of "fairness and justice," the judge-
made law of eminent domain still makes noncompensable a variety
116. Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 110,
111 (2002).
117. Michael R. Klein, Eminent Domain: Judicial Response to the Human Disruption, 46 U.
DET. J. URB. L. 1, 21 (1968).
118. Harry N. Scheiber, Private Property, "Takings," and the Rights of the Public in
American Law, 1790-1860, at 18 (Oct. 14, 1976) (unpublished paper presented at the Institute of
Humane Studies Conference on the Taking Issue: A Constitutional Perspective, Oct. 14-16, 1976,
copy on file with the author) [hereinafter Scheiber, Private Property]. "Many of the state courts
went beyond their legislatures in fashioning a law of eminent domain that reduced the obligation
to pay in takings." Id. at 19. Acting with judicial approval, railroads frequently abused the
doctrine of offsetting benefits in partial takings and condemned land for nominal consideration
and in many cases, none at all. Id. at 21. This abuse was not interdicted by California courts, but
was eventually curbed by the enactment of article I, section 14 of the California Constitution
(repealed and replaced by article I, section 19), providing that in condemnations by corporations
(other than municipal corporations) benefits could not be offset against compensation for partial
takings.
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of demonstrable economic losses that are incontestably inflicted on
condemnees, as opposed to law in other fields that requires such
harms to be paid for.'19 Mind you, I speak here not of personal,
emotional, subjective losses that are routinely compensated in tort
cases. Nor do I suggest here that such damages should be made
similarly compensable in eminent domain cases.12 ° I note however
that eviction from one's home or business can certainly cause similar
personal harms that can and do occur in non-condemnation cases.'21
Nonetheless, I limit myself here to stressing that demonstrable
economic losses that are disregarded by the eminent domain
valuation process, can and do leave condemnees inherently
undercompensated, and certainly not in the same economic position
they would be in had their property not been taken. These losses,
that are not deemed a part of "just compensation," include moving
expenses, the cost of acquisition and renovation of substitute
premises, loss of the going concern value of businesses located on
the condemned land, loss of use and loss of rents of commercial
property while the condemnation action is pending (a process that
can take years), loss of or damage to the stock in trade of a displaced
business,'22 as well as (in partial takings), the impact of the taking
and of the public project on value of the remaining land to the extent
119. E.g., Risinger, supra note 103, at 493, 495, 519-520 (discussing disparities between
compensability standards in eminent domain as compared to other fields of law).
120. I note, however, that there are some condemnation cases where this may be appropriate.
For example, I was once involved in a case in which the city served an order for immediate
possession on the landlord but not on the tenants who operated a Baskin-Robbins ice cream parlor
on the premises. Because of the city's blunder, one morning, with no warning, a city bulldozer
drove right through the thirty-one flavors even as the store's owners were about to dish out ice
cream to customers. Fortunately, no one was hurt physically. The infuriated lawyer representing
the tenants (who happened to be his parents) filed a cross-complaint for emotional distress against
the city. Violating an eminent domain taboo on personal damages, the trial judge allowed that
claim to go to the jury which awarded the tenants the modest sum of $1,500 in addition to their
"just compensation" (which included nothing for the value of their business). The city had the
good sense not to appeal that award.
121. See Sonya Bekoff Molho & Gideon Kanner, Urban Renewal: Laissez-Faire for the
Poor, Welfare for the Rich, 8 PAC. L.J. 627, 629 n.10, 641 nn.67-68 (1977), for a collection of
studies dealing with the disruptive personal and psychological effects of forced displacement of
urban populations in redevelopment projects.
122. Cmty. Redev. Agency v. Abrams, 543 P.2d 905, 922 (Cal. 1975). Some of these losses
are subject to partial compensation under the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
4601-4655 (2003), and its state counterpart, CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 7260-7277 (West 1995 &
Supp. 2007), but the Act is to a large extent a "paper tiger" because it offers only supplemental
compensation for some losses and does not purport to make condemnees whole. Courts in some
states apply it only to condemnations for federally aided projects, leaving other condemnees
outside the purview of its provisions.
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it originates on land taken from others,'23 condemnors' manipulation
of the date of value, and diminished access to the land's remainder in
partial takings.'1
4
Judicial rhetoric notwithstanding, "just compensation" as
formulated by the courts is simply not compensation; courts do not
even try to recompense condemnees for their demonstrable economic
losses proximately caused by the condemnation, and to restore them
to their precondemnation economic condition. The word
"compensation" inherently implies that some economic harm or
detriment has been inflicted on a party and the law now requires
recompense for that harm. On the other hand, "value" or "fair
market value" of a particular property is what it is, and its payment
may or may not compensate its owners for the harm or loss inflicted
on them by its seizure and by their eviction. In short, by definition,
"value" is not "compensation." So, if we say with Justice Holmes
that the Constitution deals with people, not with tracts of land, and
that the question is "what has the owner lost?", it follows that the law
should look to the economic harm inflicted on a condemnee and
provide proper recompense based on the facts of the case. As one
court observed in an oft-cited phrase, the word "compensation"
standing alone suggests that the condemnees are to be made whole,
123. See People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451 (Cal. 1960). The court,
applied the archaic rule that in part-taking cases, entitlement to severance damages is based not
on the diminution in value inflicted on the owner's remaining land by the partial taking and
operation of the public project, but on whether the harm-producing activities originated on the
land taken from that owner or from a neighbor, e.g., Keller v. Miller, 165 P. 774 (Colo. 1917),
which of course is irrelevant to the question of whether the economic harm has in fact occurred.
Symons, 357 P.2d at 455. In a striking instance of lack of even-handedness, California courts had
it that when it came to the flip side of this problem, i.e., to special benefits that are offset against
severance damages, it did not matter where those benefits originated. The Symons rule was
legislatively repealed in 1976 by section 1263.420(b) of the California Code of Civil Procedure,
which put recovery of severance damages on the same footing as the offset of benefits. See CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1263.420-430 (West 1982).
124. In order to recover compensation for impairment of access, it is insufficient that the
condemnees show a physical diminution in access and diminution in the value of the remainder
parcel in its after condition, caused by the diminished access, even though the so-called before-
and-after rule is frequently used in eminent domain valuation. Instead, the condemnees must
prove that the impairment is "substantial" a maddeningly imprecise standard of proof. Breidert
v. S. Pac. Co., 394 P.2d 719, 725 (Cal. 1964). Failure to do so results in denial of this element of
compensation, notwithstanding that the value of the remainder property is demonstrably or even
undisputedly diminished. Condemnees who want to demonstrate the substantiality of the
impairment of access to their remaining property by showing its severe decline in value in the
after condition are not permitted to do so. Perrin v. L.A. County Transp. Comm'n, 50 Cal. Rptr.
2d 488, 493 (Ct. App. 1996); Wagner v. California ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works, 124 Cal. Rptr.
224, 228 (Ct. App. 1975).
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and the addition of the adjective "just" only emphasizes the fairness
attribute of the constitutional command.
25
Perversely, when property owners argue that the law should take
into account their particular economic situations, i.e., that they
should be justly compensated for the demonstrable individual
economic losses suffered by them as a result of the specific impact of
the taking in issue, the courts respond with the rule that property
must be valued as it would be by the market in general, without
tailoring damages to the compensatory demands of a particular
owner's losses inflicted by the condemnation. Thus, to take a
common example, the value added to the subject property by the
owners' plans (no matter how imminent and how realistic) for its
improvement is disregarded in eminent domain valuation even
though they would be considered in a voluntary sales transaction.2 6
The judicial presumption is that the taking is to be treated as if it
were a voluntary sales transaction, yet it ignores the fact that no
rational property owners would voluntarily sell their land (or some
arbitrarily carved out part of it) under circumstances that would leave
them undercompensated or worse, impoverished.2 7 Adding insult to
injury, when the shoe is on the other foot and condemnees happen to
be in a position where application of the general market approach
would yield a higher figure than their specific situation calls for, the
125. Va. & Truckee R.R. Co. v. Henry, 8 Nev. 165, 171-72 (1873) ("[T]he word 'just' is used
evidently to intensify the meaning of the word 'compensation' to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for property taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample; and no
legislature can diminish by one jot the rotund expression of the constitution.").
126. Mt. Laurel Twp. v. MiPro Homes, L.L.C., 910 A.2d 617, 618 (N.J. 2006) (holding that
compensation to the landowner, who obtained all entitlements and started development of a
subdivision on the condemned land, would be limited to fair market value, taking into account the
influence of subdivision approval but excluding unrequited costs incurred by the owner); accord
People v. La Macchia, 264 P.2d 15, 24-25 (Cal. 1953) ("[E]vidence as to what the owner
intended to do with the land cannot be considered."). But cf MiPro Homes, 910 A. 2d at 620-21
(Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting).
127. The courts acknowledge that their idea of "market value" does not correspond with that
of the market:
No doubt all these elements [of compensation] would be considered by an owner in
determining whether, and at what price, to sell. No doubt, therefore, if the owner is to
be made whole for the loss consequent on the sovereign's seizure of his property, these
elements should properly be considered. But the courts have generally held that they
are not to be reckoned as part of the compensation for the fee taken by the
Government.
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945). Why not, if "fair market
value" is to be the measure of just compensation?
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courts execute an about-face and have it that the condemnee's
particular situation should govern instead.'28 It's a case of "heads I
win; tails you lose."
It is thus incontestable that the treatment of condemnees in both
direct and inverse condemnation cases does not compare favorably
with the courts' treatment of other Americans seeking compensatory
relief from the courts (injunctive relief is not available at all in
eminent domain cases).'29 Thus, in non-condemnation cases the
California Supreme Court takes the position that invasion of property
rights axiomatically results in compensable harm to the land's
occupants:
The California cases appear to draw no distinction
between cases involving nuisance and those involving
trespass in permitting an award of damages for discomfort
and annoyance directly resulting from an injury to real
property. There seems to be no sound reason to refuse to
award damages for discomfort and annoyance where the
only injury is to the real property since it is obvious that
such an injury may cause discomfort and annoyance
128. Thus, in City of Los Angeles v. Ricards, 515 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1973), the property owner
invoked the familiar rule that the existence of a condemnee's subjective development plans vel
non is irrelevant, and that therefore her property was to be valued irrespective of those. But, the
Ricards court held that inasmuch as there was no evidence of the owner's plans to develop her
land, she would be denied compensation for temporary deprivation of access to it and would
receive nominal damages only, thus abruptly making the usually irrelevant existence of the
owner's development plans the sine qua non of recovery. Id. at 587-88.
Similarly, in Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189 (1910), the
owner invoked the so-called "undivided fee rule," under which the taken property is usually
valued as the market would value it if it were owned by one person, and the award then
apportioned among the owners with various interests in it. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §
1260.220 (West 2007). But on the facts of the Boston Chamber of Commerce case, this approach
would have yielded a higher compensation figure than the alternative, aggregate-of-interests
approach of valuing the individual interests separately and adding up the respective awards. The
Court rejected the use of the "undivided fee rule" and endorsed the aggregate-of-interests
valuation approach, holding in the process that the Constitution deals with people, not with tracts
of land. Boston Chamber of Commerce, 217 U.S. at 195. For a fuller discussion of the problems
of and limitations on the "undivided fee rule," see People ex rel. Dep "t of Pub. Works v. Lynbar,
Inc., 62 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Ct. App. 1967). See also Gideon Kanner, And Now, for a Word from the
Sponsor: People v. Lynbar, Inc. Revisited, 5 U.S.F. L. REV. 39 (1970).
129. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984); see also Hurley v.
Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932).
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without also causing an actual physical injury to the
person. 3 '
Beyond that, tort plaintiffs not only collect subjective general
damages (including easily exaggerated claims of emotional distress
and loss of consortium), 3' but, more pertinent to the subject at hand,
they also benefit from the collateral source rule, which entitles them
to collect the same damages more than once from collateral
sources. 3 2  The California Supreme Court candidly justified such
multiple recoveries in tort cases as performing a "legitimate and
indispensable" function of providing funds with which to pay
plaintiffs' attorneys, and stressed that allowing only one recovery
would not provide "completeness of compensation." It is difficult to
see why the desideratum of "completeness of compensation" should
not also be the judicial watchword in eminent domain cases where
(a) the Constitution calls for an award of just compensation; (b)
faultless citizens are deliberately harmed economically for public
good; and (c) for its money, unlike in tort cases, the public receives a
substantial quid pro quo in the form of the condemnees' land at its
judicially determined fair market value. Significantly, because of
that, in eminent domain cases involving total takings of condemnees'
land, the government pays nothing (except for transactional costs)
because it only exchanges one asset (money) for another asset (land)
at the latter's judicially determined fair market value, so that its
balance sheet remains unchanged because of the acquisition. Indeed,
the condemnor often profits after the condemnation when the former
owner's land may and often does become more valuable than the
compensation paid for it, as it becomes available for or put to use as
part of a public improvement or (particularly) a major commercial
130. Kornoffv. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 288 P.2d 507, 513 (Cal. 1955) (emphasis added).
"[A]nnoyance and discomfort were natural consequences of... 'an invasion of a protectible
interest in real property."' Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
131. See Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1974).
132. Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 69 (Cal. 1970). The last time I sat
on a jury (in an airplane crash case), I learned after the case was over that the plaintiffs had
already collected once from the airplane manufacturer, once from the engine manufacturer, and
once again from the company that had maintained the lost plane. The action in which I sat as a
juror was an attempt to collect for the fourth time (this time from the carburetor manufacturer,
even though, as I also learned after the case was over, the NTSB crash investigation had
concluded that the plane's magneto, not its carburetor, was at fault).
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redevelopment use (which is why eminent domain law requires that
value to the taker not be allowed as just compensation). 33
B. Run for the Hills! The Embargo Is Coming!
There is nearly universal consensus that legal 'fair market
value" is practically a euphemism, in the sense that it
generally does not fairly compensate landowners. 1
34
In theory, condemnees are to be indemnified and placed in the
same pecuniary position in which they would have been had there
been no condemnation of their property. But in spite of being
confronted with the manifest injustices being inflicted on faultless
people in the name of "just" compensation, California judges assert
that it is their duty to keep condemnation awards down, 135 often
repeating the mantra that "fears have been expressed that
compensation allowed too liberally will seriously impede, if not stop,
beneficial public improvements because of the greatly increased
cost.' 36  The quoted expression has been repeated by California
courts at least eight times 37 without the courts once inquiring into (a)
who expressed those fears; (b) were those fears realistic or did the
party voicing them exaggerate or pursue its self-interest in doing so;
(c) on the basis of what credible evidence were those fears
expressed; and (d) why would it be "too liberal" to indemnify
condemnees for all demonstrable economic losses inflicted on them
by the condemnation, given the many judicial statements of principle
that condemnees are to be made whole. It seems clear that unless
these inquiries are honestly made, any judicial fears of
unaffordability are without substance and merely disclose an
institutionalized anti-condemnee bias on the part of the courts. To
133. "[T]he question is what has the owner lost? not, What has the taker gained?" Boston
Chamber of Commerce, 217 U.S. at 195.
134. Aharon Lehavi & Amiz N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1704,
1718 (2007).
135. See People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451, 455 (Cal. 1960).
136. Bacich v. Bd. of Control of Cal., 144 P.2d 818, 823 (Cal. 1943).
137. Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 909 (Cal. 1995); Varjabedian v. City
of Madera, 572 P.2d 43, 51 (Cal. 1977); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 237, 248 (Cal.
1975) (Clark, J., dissenting); Holtz v. Superior Court, 475 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1970); Albers v.
County of Los Angeles, 398 P.2d 129, 136 (Cal. 1965); Pac. Outdoor Adver. Co. v. City of
Burbank, 149 Cal. Rptr. 906, 911-12 (Ct. App. 1978); Orange County Flood Control Dist. v.
Sunny Crest Dairy, Inc., 143 Cal. Rptr. 803, 810 (Ct. App. 1978); People ex rel. Dep't of Pub.
Works v. Volunteers of Am., 98 Cal. Rptr. 423, 433 (Ct. App. 1971).
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put this judicial failure to substantiate such hyperbolic assertions into
focus, compare City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court
(Janeway),35 a tort case where the California Supreme Court
responded to "parade of horribles" apprehensions of excessive
liability by conducting an extensive, meticulous, multi-page inquiry
into the merits of assertions that invalidation of exculpatory
agreements in cases of gross negligence (as being against public
policy) would eliminate or unduly impact recreational activities
provided by operators intimidated by a specter of liability.
The courts also take refuge at times in the bromide that just
compensation must be just to the taker as well as to the owner whose
property is taken. Obviously, it is unobjectionable to say that the
owners should receive no more than the full measure of "just
compensation," objectively and fairly determined. But it is quite
another story when courts overtly manipulate the definition and
extent of that "just" compensation to favor condemnors by avowedly
keeping the cost of land acquisitions down, rather than ensuring that
full and fair compensation is paid to the parties whose property is
taken and who sustain demonstrable economic losses in the process.
Just how consciously depressing condemnees' allowable
compensation, or denying them compensation altogether for a variety
of economic losses admittedly suffered by them but judicially
deemed to be noncompensable, constitutes "justice" to anybody,
much less to the condemnor who thus gains an unjustified windfall
by being able to acquire property on the cheap, these courts have
never explained. Remember also that, inasmuch as we are dealing
here with economic losses, the total cost of public projects is the
same whether the condemnees are fairly compensated or not; the
only valid question is whether the full project cost will be spread on
the benefited society or disproportionately imposed on the
condemnees.
The just-to-the-condemnor bromide originated in the Supreme
Court's outright misunderstanding of basic property law and is at
138. 161 P.3d 1095, 1097 (Cal. 2007) (holding that a release of liability relating to
recreational activities is not effective as against claims of gross negligence on grounds of public
policy). Note particularly the description of the extent of the factual inquiries conducted by the
court's staff to refute the apprehensions of excessive liability presented by the defendant and the
amici curiae supporting its position. Id. at 1114 n.52.
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best a cheap shot.'39 No one, to the best of my knowledge, argues
that condemnors should be unjustly treated by the courts. All
litigants are entitled to fair treatment. So what? The problem is what
policy choice should the courts make in those situations where ruling
one way would be arguably "unfair" to one side, but ruling the other
way would be arguably "unfair" to that party's adversary. 4 ° At this
point in the decision-making process, judicial invocation of justice
for the condemnor, when the Bill of Rights guarantees just
compensation to condemnees for the taking of their property, does
nothing to resolve the economic or ethical problem. It only provides
a smoke screen for unprincipled decision making that, for all the
pious talk about judicial independence, disregards the other "I-word"
(impartiality) and builds in pro-condemnor bias into judicial decision
making as a matter of policy.
139. The "just to the taker" notion traces back to Searl v. School District, 133 U.S. 553
(1890). Searl involved a unique factual situation in which a school district, believing itself to be
the rightful owner of the subject property, built a school on it. To clear title as against another
party claiming a so-called "squatter's title" under Colorado law, the District brought a
condemnation action in which the holder of that title claimed not only the value of the land but
also the value of the school buildings erected in good faith by the District. The Court rejected
that claim and in the process of ruling for the District stated, "[I]t is the duty of the State, in the
conduct of the inquest by which the compensation, is ascertained, to see that it is just, not merely
to the individual whose property is taken, but to the public which is to pay for it." Id. at 562. But
the Searl Court's offhand statement was hardly consistent with prevailing property law and
indeed, eminent domain law. See United States v. Jacks, 47 Cal. 515 (1874) (holding that the
condemnor, who trespassed on the owner's land and built improvements on it, had to pay for
them when it later formally condemned the property); Village of St. Johnsville v. Smith, 77 N.E.
617, 619-21 (N.Y. 1906) (same). Suffice it to say that the law governing the rights of improvers
of someone else's property is not as simple as Searl made it appear to be. See CAL. CODE CIV.
PROC. § 741(b) (West 2007). See generally Taliaferro v. Colasso, 294 P.2d 774 (Cal. Ct. App.
1956). In short, the Searl Court's glib assertion, for all its superficial moral appeal, was simply
bad law.
140. See, e.g., L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Cont'l Dev. Corp., 941 P.2d 809 (Cal.
1997). There, the court held that general benefits to the area, not just special benefits flowing
directly to the remainder of the partially taken property, may be offset against severance damages
because to do otherwise (by following the established precedent, Beveridge v. Lewis, 70 P. 1083
(Cal. 1902)) would be unfair to the condemnor who would thus pay more than the loss in value of
the remaining property. But that, went the counterargument, would be unfair to the condemnees
who would thus be charged for those general benefits by having their "just" compensation
reduced, while their neighbors would get the same general benefits gratis. The court invoked the
"just to the condemnor" bromide and chose the first option, overruling Beveridge v. Lewis in the
process. It joined a miniscule minority of jurisdictions and held that general benefits may be
offset against severance damages, thus imposing greater economic burdens on condemnees than
on anyone else. 941 P.2d at 824. But, though asked to do so, the court refrained from expressly
overruling a correlative precedent denying recovery of general damages in condemnation cases.
Id. at 821; see Eachus v. L.A. Consol. Elec. Ry. Co., 37 P. 750, 751 (Cal. 1894) (holding general
damages to be noncompensable in eminent domain). And that, folks, is what we call "justice" in
California eminent domain law.
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The correct, or at least principled, resolution of this policy
problem can only come from a candid judicial acknowledgement of
the purpose of the limitations imposed on the government by the Bill
of Rights, namely to protect the people from the government, not the
other way around.4' As Professor Callies put it, the Fifth
Amendment "is a bedrock principle contained in the Bill of Rights
amendments to our Federal Constitution, designed not to further the
goals and desires of the majority, but as a shield against
majoritarian excesses at the expense of an otherwise defenseless
minority . ".1."42
If a condemnor chooses to pursue projects that are costly and
inflict great economic harm on persons displaced in the process, that
is hardly "unjust" to it. It is the direct result of its own judicially
unreviewable decision making.'43 It is inconsistent to argue that the
compensatory consequences of the condemnor's own decision as to
what kind of land and how much of it to take for a project of its own
design give rise to "unfairness" to it, and that therefore the courts
should make things "fair" by abandoning their neutrality and ride to
the government's rescue by shortchanging the constitutionally
protected condemnees.'" Ironically, under California decisional law,
when defense lawyers in general civil litigation urge a jury to bring
in a low verdict because the impecunious condition of their clients
would make a high verdict unfair, the courts deem that to be
prejudicial misconduct of counsel giving rise to reversible error.'45 I
fail to see how such misconduct can be said to rise to the level of
legitimate policy when engaged in by judges rather than lawyers, in
eminent domain cases rather than tort trials.
141. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (explaining that the purpose of the
Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause is to distribute the cost of public works on the
society that benefits from them, and not force individuals to bear them disproportionately).
142. Callies, supra note 71, at 343 (emphasis added).
143. See Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923) (holding that a
condemnor's determinations of necessity for the public project and its design are conclusive).
144. The condemnors' position in this regard brings to mind the illustration of chutzpa, in
which a mugger beats up his victim while loudly yelling "Help! Help!"
145. Hoffman v. Brandt, 421 P.2d 425, 429 (Cal. 1966) ("Obviously, the questions of liability
and the amount of damages, if any, in the ordinary personal injury case are to be determined
without regard to the defendant's ability to pay any judgment rendered against him."). Why isn't
this equally obvious in eminent domain cases where a fortiori the liable party (unlike a tort
defendant in a personal injury case) receives a full quid pro quo for its payment of damages?
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It is difficult to improve on Professor Michelman's point when
he called for
resolute sophistication in the face of occasional insistence
that compensation payments must be limited lest society
find itself unable to afford beneficial plans and
improvements. What society cannot, indeed, afford is to
impoverish itself. It cannot afford to instigate measures
whose costs, including costs which remain "unsocialized,"
exceed their benefits. Thus, it would appear that any
measure which society cannot afford or, putting it another
way, is unwilling to finance under conditions of full
compensation, society cannot afford at all.146
Harking back to the U.S. Supreme Court's endorsement of
"political ethics" as the policy underlying eminent domain law, it is
difficult to reconcile any notion of ethics with the plight of property
owners who fortuitously find themselves in the path of public
projects but who are then shortchanged to facilitate supposed
"justice" to the government for the economic consequences of its
own choices.'47 A fortiori, where the government undertakes unduly
costly and at times wasteful projects, particularly where those
projects are pursued to enrich redevelopers or to enhance the local
economy. To say nothing of enhancing the standing of politicians
seeking to curry favor with their constituencies by "bringing home
the pork" in the form of federal or state funds, enabling them to brag
about receiving "free money."'48 This is a particularly important
consideration when reflected on in the context of the tidal wave of
public money that is earmarked by Congress and profligately spent
by state and local governments ostensibly for proposed public
146. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1181 (1967) (footnote
omitted).
147. It cannot be emphasized often enough and strongly enough that large amounts of
damages can be awarded to condemnees only when they have been deprived of very valuable
property, or where the condemnation inflicts very high severance damages on their remaining
land in partial takings cases. To suggest that high levels of damages would be awarded even
though unwarranted is to suggest that the judiciary is incapable of distinguishing between
meritorious and frivolous claims, a proposition indignantly rejected by the California Supreme
Court in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 922-23 (Cal. 1968).
148. See Molho & Kanner, supra note 121, at 628 n.5 (quoting redevelopment officials
bragging about receiving "free money" for their projects).
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projects, but is in fact squandered, 149 or fails to achieve any legitimate
public purpose. 5°
To suggest in the context of the history of ineptitude and
consistent underestimating of the cost of public projects, 5' which has
149. For an egregious recent example, see the case of the infamous Gravina Island bridge
affair in which Congress appropriated some $250 million for a new bridge in Alaska, rivaling in
size the Golden Gate Bridge but going from nowhere to nowhere. William Neikirk, In D.C., the
New "S" Word is "Sacrifice" to Offset Spending, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 2, 2005, at C12. Responding
to a withering wave of public criticism, Alaska has abandoned plans to build this "bridge to
nowhere," but it got to keep the $233 million which it is now free to spend (or fritter away) on
anything it wants. Alaska Seeks Alternative to Bridge Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at 24.
Another example is Boston's "Big Dig," an underground freeway originally estimated to cost
some $2.6 billion, that has already consumed over $14 billion and has produced a faulty system
of tunnels that have been the subject of leaks and, in one instance, a collapse of the ceiling. "It is
the most expensive highway project in American history and had been plagued by cost overruns
and leaks before the [recent] fatal collapse." All but One Tunnel Are Open in Big Dig, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at A8; see Jason H. Peterson, Note, The Big Dig Disaster: Was Design-
Build the Answer?, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 909, 923-24 (2007). The sheer size of these
boondoggles is attention-arresting, but that should not obscure the fact that failures and
deficiencies of lesser projects, for which private land has been acquired by eminent domain, is a
commonplace event.
150. For a fuller discussion of such problems, see Laws and Sausages, supra note 41, at 713
n.142, 719 n.165, 789-791 nn.450-56. Note particularly the local case of the nonexistent Los
Angeles "Intercontinental" Airport (located in Palmdale), consisting of some 17,500 acres of land
acquired by the city in the 1970s at a cost of over $100 million, with nothing to show for it. Id. at
789 n.450. Then there is the case of the Los Angeles "Belmont educational center," a high school
on which the local school district spent $217 million only to discover that it had built an unusable
facility by locating it on an abandoned oil field that is seeping methane, making the "educational
center" unusable as a school. Id. at 713 n. 142. Not to be overlooked is the North Hollywood
redevelopment project on which the L.A. Community Redevelopment Agency spent some $117
million only to discover that its plan (pursued for 20 years) that centered on construction of new
studios, was infeasible, forcing it to start all over again, hoping this time that a nearby subway
terminus will attract residential tenants for its born-again redevelopment project. Id.; Patrick
McGreevy & T. Christian Miller, Heady Plans, Hard Reality, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at Al.
And, there is also the Los Angeles Convention Center (built on land condemned in the 1960s),
that has failed to live up to its promises and (in spite of its enlargement that was supposed to lure
more exhibitors) is costing the city some $30 million annually in debt service. Joel Kotkin,
Urban Myths; Don't Feed the White Elephant, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2006, at M 1.
151. As far back as 1966, a California Highway Commissioner noted that the actual cost of
highways consistently exceeded estimates by 32 percent, "most of the increment coming from
additional right-of-way costs." Joseph C. Houghteling, Confessions of a Highway Commissioner,
CRY CALIFORNIA, Spring 1966, at 29, 30 (suggesting pervasive underestimation of right-of-way
costs).
The proponents of public projects have an incentive to understate the property
acquisition costs associated with a project to facilitate its approval. It is particularly
easy to understate or omit damages to property that is not acquired but will suffer a
negative impact from the project. When the true cost of the acquisition is revealed
through the judicial process, usually years later, these same proponents blame the
property owners, the attorneys representing them, or juries for the cost overruns.
Charles S. McFarland, Protecting Private Property Rights After the Public Use Ship Has Sailed,
LITIG., Fall 2007, at 25, 30. This is consistent with studies indicating a persistent pattern of
underestimation of the cost of public works of all sorts, "Project estimates between 1910 and
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been common in many public works projects, that it would be
"unfair" to the government to require it to provide genuine
compensation to the victims of its ambitions, even as it squanders
huge amounts of public funds, is to invert moral standards. If the
government has billions of dollars to waste, it surely has the
necessary funds to make whole people whom it targets to be
bulldozed aside to make room for public and not-so-public projects.
Judges who, without factual inquiries, facilitate such government
conduct have much to be ashamed of when they resort to joining
condemnors' advocates' fiscal lamentations without any factual
inquiry into whether such "poor mouth" arguments have any
economic merit.
152
Apart from the moral point, the economic point is that the total
cost of public projects, whether sound or not, is what it is, regardless
of whether the condemnees whose land is taken are fairly
compensated. The only valid question is who will bear the total
economic burdens resulting from the creation of such projects: the
government that designs them, chooses what land to take, benefits
from the activity in question, and has the ability to spread the cost
fairly on the public that benefits from its activity? Or should that
burden fall disproportionately on individual condemnees who suffer
a taking of their homes and businesses, and who may thus be forced
to bear substantial losses alone?
53
The problem of undercompensation, particularly in the form of
inadequate precondemnation offers, is widespread. Offers are
1998 were short of the final costs an average of 28 percent." Michael Wilson, Study Finds Steady
Overruns in Public Projects, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at A14. And that does not include
situations in which funds are budgeted for public projects, but later squandered on other things.
California state government is currently engaged in a course of conduct whereby funds raised by
the sale of bonds approved by the electorate for water and levee improvement projects are being
squandered on unrelated local pet projects of legislators, such as museums, aquariums and
recreational trails. Evan Halper, Water Bond May Be Tapped for Many Uses, L.A. TIMES, May
21, 2007, at B 1. Much the same is happening at the federal level. Richard Simon, Water Bill Is
Flooded with Earmarks, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2007, at A10.
152. For a refreshing and all too rare example of a court making such an inquiry, see City of
Los Angeles v. Keck, 92 Cal. Rptr. 599, 604 (Ct. App. 1971) (finding the proposed taking
unnecessary and chastising the city for its wasteful expenditure of public funds). See also Regus
v. City of Baldwin Park, 139 Cal. Rptr. 196, 205 (Ct. App. 1977) (deploring the municipal
practice of taking on risky private commercial projects that place public funds at risk).
153. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) ("The Fifth Amendment's guarantee
that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.").
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frequently accepted by large numbers of property owners, in spite of
their inadequacy. This occurs because those owners are unso-
phisticated and believe the offers are fair, or that their government
would not try to shortchange them,'54 or they are convinced that "you
can't fight city hall," or they want the process to be done with so
they can get on with their lives, or, most importantly, they lack the
knowledge and funds necessary to ascertain true value and mount an
effective legal defense. Moreover, in smaller cases, the economic
stakes do not justify litigation because probable increases over and
above the condemnor's initial offer may be close to or less than the
unrecoverable cost of litigation. The consensus among condem-
nation lawyers is that, unless the "spread" between the condemnor's
offer and the property's demonstrable value is on the order of
$75,000 to $100,000, litigation is not economically feasible. Thus,
condemning agencies regularly reap unjustified windfalls from the
fact that the majority of their offers (including the many low-ball
ones) are accepted without litigation or even without involvement by
a private appraiser or lawyer. The additional sums they may have to
pay after trials of the relatively few cases where their offers are
rejected, are offset to a large extent (or perhaps entirely) by the gains
secured by settling the vast majority of land acquisitions for
parsimonious amounts.
C. The Floccinaucinihilipilificators'55
I am in charge of acquiring lands for the National Park
Service. Even though we know what your lands are worth,
we are going to try and get them for 30 cents on every
dollar that we feel they are worth. Of course, you don't
have to accept this 30 cents on the dollar. We will let you
154. Over the years, I have found it interesting that, notwithstanding the prevailing skepticism
about government, people who face forcible acquisition of their land want to believe that the
system will treat them fairly. For an insight into the unpleasant reality, see City of Naperville v.
Old Second National Bank of Aurora, 763 N.E.2d 951, 956 (Il. App. 2002) (offering below
condemnor's own appraisal), and Althaus v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 688, 691-92 (1985) (quoting
a Park Service official who demanded that owners sell their land to the government for thirty
cents on the dollar, on pain of the acquisition process being interminably delayed, requiring the
owners to incur large expenses for lawyers). See also United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605
F.2d 762, 777-80 n.22 (5th Cir. 1979) (describing wholesale abuses of unrepresented small
property owners, consisting of taking their properties without affording them a trial).
155. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Kelso Corp., 416 A.2d 1339, 1340 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1980) ("It means the habit of estimating things as worthless or of belittling the achievements
of others." (citing SUSAN KELZ SPERLING, POPLOLLIES AND BELLIBONES, A CELEBRATION OF
LOST WORDS 98 (1977))).
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wait for a couple of years. If you don't take 30 cents on the
dollar right now you wait a couple of years. After a couple
of years, ifyou don't take the 30 cents on the dollar, we are
going to condemn it. We will condemn your property. You
know what that is going to mean? That means that you are
going to have to hire an expensive lawyer from the city and
he is going to take one-third of what you get. Plus, you
know who is going to have to pay the court costs. You are.
That is in addition to these expensive lawyers. 1
56
This government attitude is a predictable result of the mass
appraisal process that is used in connection with laying out public
works such as highway rights-of-way and redevelopment projects.
Also, because of the time lag between the gathering of market data
and completion of the pre-litigation appraisals, it often happens that
the value of the subject land may have gone up so that the appraisals
are outdated when the offers based on them are made. As a result,
the owners receive offers of, not the current value of their land, but
the value at the time the appraisals were made. In the rapidly rising
real estate market that we have been experiencing historically in
California, that can make a great deal of difference. 57 And that is not
all. As a knowledgeable appraiser described the process:
The most important factor that affects appraisers
preparing reports for governmental agencies is that the
majority of assignments involve 'projects' that have
multiple parcels. An example of this type of project is a
road widening project that requires the acquisition of right-
of-way from several parcels along a particular road. In
these multiple parcel projects the initial appraisals are
written with time and budget restraints. Appraisers who are
hired by government agencies must submit a fee schedule
that is competitive with other appraisers who are bidding on
the project. The appraisal process and fees are part of the
156. Althaus, 7 CI. Ct. at 691-92 (quoting the National Park Service Chief Land Acquisition
Officer, addressing a group of landowners whose property was slated for acquisition for a
National Park). Note that apart from its extortionate nature, this statement was untrue;
condemnation lawyers do not charge one-third of the recovery, but only one-third of what they
recover for the client over and above the condemnor's offer.
157. Saratoga Fire Prot. Dist. v. Hackett, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 697 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating
that the value of the subject property increased by $1.2 million while the case was pending); see
Bigham, supra note 114, at 76-77 (noting the delays between a condemnor's appraisal and offer
and the heavy legal fees associated with collecting the resulting difference in opinions of value).
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overall budget that the government agency has set in order
to complete the project.
It is difficult for appraisers who accept these multiple
parcel assignments to spend time and effort in preparing an
effective initial report due to the fact that the fee allocated
to each parcel reflects a bulk discount and the appraiser is
not in a mindset that each report will end up being involved
in a court proceeding. As appraisers we all know that an
appraisal that is intended to assist in eminent domain
proceedings can end up being involved in a court
proceeding and we may have to provide expert testimony
based on the initial report. However, we also realize that if
a property owner does not accept the offer of just
compensation based on the initial report and condemnation
proceedings are filed, we will have the opportunity to
complete another report knowing that this appraisal will
have to stand up to cross examination and much more
scrutiny.
I call the initial appraisal process involving a multiple
parcel project, 'Throw it against the wall and see what
sticks.' As appraisers we know that only a few private
property owners want to take their cases to court.'58
In other words, even assuming good faith on the part of the
condemnor's right-of-way acquisition personnel, the initial
appraisals on which prelitigation offers are based are mass-produced
by hasty and-human nature being what it is-often shoddy
appraisal work performed by people striving to be successful low
bidders but still meet their deadlines and make a profit. The
government appraisals produced for use in valuation trials (where
they will be subjected to critical scrutiny) are generally better but not
consistently adequate because, among other reasons, they too are
performed under pressure to please the appraisers' government
employer'59 in order to secure future business. Remember that there
158. Keith Harper, President, Member of the Appraisal Inst., Preparing an Effective Appraisal
Report, Handout at CLE International Eminent Domain Program H-1 (Mar. 18-19, 2004); see
also William C. Bryant, Eminent Domain-Its Use and Misuse, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 259, 269
(1970) (noting that condemnors can shop around for appraisers).
159. See Dan Browning, MnDOT Appraisers Allege Pressure; State Occasionally Asks Them
to Redo [Appraisal] Reports, Legislator Says, STAR TRIB., Oct. 13, 2003, at lB.
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is no such thing as evidence of value; there is only evidence of the
appraisal witness' opinion of value, 160 and opinions are the stuff of
horse races and lawsuits. Unsurprisingly, government appraisers
tend to exercise their judgment by tending to value property
conservatively, hoping to secure future appraisal business. 6'
Condemnees who reject precondemnation offers and go to trial
usually fare much better than those who accept the prelitigation
government offers. 62  Moreover, even at its best, appraising is not a
160. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 813 (Deering 2004) (stating that the value of property may
be shown only by the opinion testimony of qualified witnesses).
161. See Department of Transportation ex rel. People v. 151 Interstate Road Corp., 777
N.E.2d 369 (Ill. App. 2002), for an example of a court dissecting the deficiencies of a con-
demnor's appraisal. The vast majority of condemnees have no repeat business to offer their
appraisers. It is a rare and unfortunate property owner who is sued in eminent domain more than
once in a lifetime. That, however, is not the full story because forensic appraisers are usually
recommended for employment as expert witnesses by condemnees' lawyers. Thus, appraisers
may try to impress condemnees' counsel with their skills in appraising property liberally in the
hope of securing future employment by word of mouth. But there is no realistic prospect of such
appraisers being able to secure employment on a mass scale comparable to that available to
appraisers who work for the government. Also, since some economic losses inflicted on
condemnees are not compensable, they have a legitimate incentive to maximize the damages that
are allowed by the courts, and their selection of appraisers generally tends to reflect that. This is
consistent with the law that defines fair market value as the highest price that would be agreed on
the date of value by buyers and sellers in a voluntary transaction. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE §
1263.320 (West Supp. 2007). The underlying theory is that inasmuch as condemnees are
deprived of an opportunity to take their time to find a voluntary buyer willing to pay top dollar,
the law provides them with that benefit. Thus, the appraiser selection process on the owner's side
prizes appraisers' skills and track record with not much of a premium on being a low bidder-
condemnees realize that they face probably their only condemnation experience of a lifetime so
they and their lawyers who recommend appraisers seek quality rather than low cost, tending to
result in a better product.
162. In 1999 the California Law Revision Commission reviewed the report of the Institute for
Legislative Practice, Some Descriptive Statistics, that examined the results in California eminent
domain cases between early 1985 through April 15, 1999, and concluded that "[t]he average jury
verdict is about 41% higher than the plaintiffs offer and the average bench verdict is 33% above
the plaintiffs offer." Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, First Supplement to Memorandum 99-66:
Litigation Expenses in Eminent Domain Cases 2 (Nov. 16, 1999). The Commission noted that
the 41 percent rate is identical to that found in an earlier Utah study published by the Salt Lake
Tribune. That study indicated that of the property owners who reject condemnors' offers and
insist on valuation trials, 80 percent recover more than the offers, in amounts averaging 41
percent over those offers. Ray Rivera, UDOT: Fair Deals or Land Grabs?, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Oct. 24, 1999, at A1; Ray Rivera & Dan Harrie, UDOT Appraisals Lose in Court, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Oct. 24, 1999, at A9. Similar results were observed in Minnesota. See Dan Browning,
Losing Ground: MnDOT's Tactics Squeeze Landowners, STAR TRIB., Sep. 21, 2003, at 1 A ("The
Star Tribune analyzed MnDOT's computer records covering more than 1,200 cases since the late
1980s in which disagreements over land value were decided by court-appointed commissions. In
two-thirds of those cases, the commission determined that property owners deserved at least 20
percent more money than MnDOT first offered. In a third of the cases, the award was at least
double. . . . When property owners refuse MnDOT's purchase price, they can appeal to a
commission appointed by the court to determine the value. These commissions often find
MnDOT's offers too low. Here are the results of 847 such cases decided from 1998 to 2003.
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science; it involves a number of assumptions and subjective
judgments on the part of the appraisers who work for the
government. They are thus within their professional prerogatives to
take a conservative approach if they so choose, and thus come up
with low values. The proof of the pudding lies in condemnees'
lawyers' practice of charging contingent fees based-not on the
entire recovery as is done in tort cases-but only on the overage, i.e.,
the amount of money they secure for their clients over and above the
condemnor's offer or evidence.163 Since condemnation lawyers are
generally prosperous, it necessarily follows that-unless we posit
that they are magicians consistently capable of reducing jurors'
minds to putty with their silver-tongued rhetoric-government
appraisals are often deficient and readily refuted in court. This is
particularly true in cases of very large spreads between condemnors'
and condemnees' evidence of value, where large property owners
(unlike the run-of-the-mill small fry who occupy the unenviable
position of fish in a barrel) are able to secure the best representation
and appraisal talent, with results that speak for themselves."
It strains credulity beyond its breaking point to suppose that in
all these huge, hard-fought cases, condemnees' lawyers and
appraisers consistently bamboozled judges and jurors (who, lest we
forget, are taxpayers themselves) to the extent of obtaining such
favorable results, as against condemnors' appraisals presented by
highly experienced career condemnation lawyers who are employed
by the government. And even that fanciful scenario would not
account for the voluntarily arrived-at settlement figures listed in the
MnDOT's appraisals: $78.8 million. Amount paid or pending: $130.5 million."); see also
unpublished paper by Clemson and Emory University Professors S. Alan Aycock and Roy T.
Black, Special Master Bias in Eminent Domain Cases, Oct. 5, 2007 (demonstrating that, in
Georgia, the Special Masters appointed by courts to perform the initial valuation in eminent
domain cases consistently undervalue the taken land, and finding that the mean condemnor
appraisal is $32,722, the mean Special Master Award is $51,304, and the mean final judicial
award to the owner is $177,758 (id. at 7), an increase of 543 percent over the condemnor's
evidence) (copy on file with author).
163. Florida has codified such a system of lawyer compensation. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
73.092, 73.015(5) (West 2004). One unfortunate aspect of that reality is that, unless the spread
between the condemnor's offer and the property's demonstrable value is large enough, the
condemnee may not be able to secure competent representation. See State ex rel. Dept. of Transp.
v. Downey, 172 P.3d 225, 227 (Okla. Civ. App. 2007) (noting that attorneys' fees may consume
the gain in compensation secured in condemnation proceedings to such an extent that the
condemnee would be better off accepting the condemnor's demonstrably inadequate offer).
164. See infra Appendix.
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Appendix. In each of these cases there had to be serious flaws in the
condemnors' appraisal approaches or in the credibility of their
evidence, so that the efforts of their usually skilled and highly
experienced lawyers were unavailing.
Notwithstanding this reality, the sometimes explicit but usually
unspoken message' 65 in judicial attitudes toward condemnees is the
judges' unjustified belief that genuinely fair compensation to
condemnees, for all the demonstrable economic losses concededly
suffered by them, would unduly burden the public treasury, and that
it is therefore the responsibility of the courts to keep condemnation
awards down lest an "embargo" on public projects be declared, 66 and
that courts must be receptive to condemnors' desire to guard the
public fisc in awarding compensation. 67  But, as one commentator
put it, "The obvious question which springs to the fore is: How do
the courts know? Having never afforded compensation for most
consequential injuries arising from eminent domain, it becomes clear
that the courts can not 'know.""11
68
The justifications for favoring condemnors were formulated
over a century ago, long before urban redevelopment and urban
highways, with their mass displacement of urban populations, burst
upon the scene. These judicial expressions, however unwarranted, at
least revealed a concern for the creation of genuine public works and
originally dealt with takings of uninhabited land. But in an era of
redevelopment, "economic" or otherwise, it is no longer a case of
public works being supposedly at stake. In redevelopment cases,
now with the blessing of Kelo, the engine that drives the newly
minted "public purpose" is the redevelopers' private financial gain,
which is essential to the redevelopment project's economic success.
Unlike some earlier cases in which it was said that private gain was
incidental to the public use, in redevelopment cases, particularly in
165. See Robert Kratovil & Frank J. Harrison, Jr., Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42
CAL. L. REV. 596, 599 (1954) ("These policy factors ... are usually left undisclosed or concealed
behind a veil of concept." (citing Bacich v. Bd. of Control of Cal., 144 P.2d 818, 823 (Cal.
1943))).
166. People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451, 455 (Cal. 1960).
167. People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Superior Court (Rodoni), 436 P.2d 342, 344 (Cal.
1968).
168. Klein, supra note 117, at 34. Others have been less charitable: "The old chestnut that
increased compensation will bankrupt the states has absolutely no validity." Frank A. Aloi &
Arthur Abba Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Good Will, and Business Losses in Eminent
Domain, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 604, 647 (1968).
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those financed by tax increment bonds, private gain is essential to the
enterprise, with any anticipated public benefits deriving from the
redevelopers' prosperity. In other words, the hoped-for increase in
tax revenues is an incidental byproduct of the indispensable private
gain enjoyed by the redevelopers and their vendees or tenants.
To achieve the promised success, the subsidized redevelopers
must make large profits, some of which will hopefully trickle down
into the community, thus justifying the process. That is what
"economic redevelopment" is all about. Thus, "public" use or not,
these projects are designed to generate large amounts of private
money, so that it is difficult to see why those who stand to gain in
this fashion should not be required to forgo a part of their gain to pay
for the true cost of doing business, and not be able to fob off a
substantial part of that cost on innocent bystanders. It is an old
maxim of jurisprudence that "[h]e who takes the benefit must bear
the burden,"'69 and it fits this situation like the proverbial glove.
D. The Clouded Crystal Ball
History has not dealt kindly with judicial fears of the
"embargo." The nineteenth-century Farmer case 7 ° (which intoned
the "embargo" shibboleth for the first time) was eventually overruled
by the California Supreme Court itself because it was inconsistent
with modem transportation reality 7' and the Symons rule was
legislatively repealed by the adoption of section 1263.420(b) of the
California Code of Civil Procedure. As for Rodoni (discussed infra),
not only was its rule repealed by section 1240.410 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure, but the California Supreme Court's
majority opinion further suffered the indignity of being publicly
exposed as unfounded by an investigation of State excess land
acquisitions, conducted by the Little Hoover Commission.'72 The
Commission's investigation revealed that condemnation of excess
lands by the California Division of Highways, far from saving the
169. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3521 (West 1997).
170. Levee Dist. No. 9 v. Farmer, 35 P. 569 (Cal. 1894).
171. Valenta v. County of L.A., 384 P.2d 725, 727 (Cal. 1964).
172. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CALIFORNIA DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS EXCESS RIGHT OF WAY (1972); see also William Endicott,
Handling of State Freeway Land Hit, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1972, at Al ("Report [c]harges
[m]ismanagement of $100 [m]illion."). Little has changed since then. See infra note 174.
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State money as successfully urged by the condemnor in Rodoni,
proved to be a proverbial rat hole for public funds. It wasted some
one hundred million dollars accumulating large holdings of
distressed land that the State could neither use itself nor sell. Indeed,
it turned out that the State's excess-lands program was so
incompetently run that its managers were not aware that the State
owned some ten million dollars worth of excess lands as part of it.173
So much for protecting the fisc. Little has changed in that regard, as
disclosed by a recent expos6 of the State's incompetence and
inefficiency in holding large tracts of improved and unimproved land
it acquired in the past but is unable to use.174 A recent study by the
Orange County Register shows that, of all the land acquired by the
California Department of Transportation ("CalTrans") since 1992,
only 53 percent has been devoted to the building of roads, 36 percent
has been declared excess or sold or is being held with its future
unknown, and another 11 percent, though assigned to projects, was
later declared excess or sold.'75
These were not the only examples of such misguided judicial
concerns over nonexistent economic problems. In Friesen v. City of
Glendale, 7 6 the California Supreme Court succumbed to the
importunings of some twenty governmental amici curiae and held
that covenants running with the land were not compensable property
interests in eminent domain actions, even though they were treated as
173. Endicott, supra note 172.
174. Kimberly Kindy & Natalya Shulyakovskaya, Highway Robbery, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Oct. 15, 2006, at News 1 (describing CalTrans's acquisition of large holdings of improved
land which it is neither using nor selling, nor maintaining, causing a loss to local taxing
authorities estimated at $78 million to $300 million); see Kimberly Kindy & Natalya
Shulyakovskaya, Building Costs Mount for State, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 15, 2006, at News
16 (discussing CalTrans's payment of some $29 million in inverse condemnation damages for
harm caused to homes by its negligence); see also Associated Press, Caltrans Bought Houses, Let
Them Decay, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 18, 2006, at 2; Steven Greenhut, California's Biggest, Nastiest
Landlord, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Nov. 26, 2006, at Commentary 1. Nor is the California
experience unique. See Jeffrey Gettleman, As School-Building Plan Fails, New Jersey Is Left
with Slums, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2005, at A1; Tomas Alex Tizon, This Jail Takes No Prisoners,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2006, at Al (discussing how, after spending $59 million on a new jail,
Portland, Oregon is not using it because it failed to provide operating funds, and quoting the
sheriff as saying, "Even I get tired of telling people how dumb we are."); Louis Uchitelle, States
Pay for Jobs, but It Doesn't Always Pay Off, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at A1; Timothy
Williams, Heralded as Parks, but Looking More Like Dumps, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2005, at Al.
175. Kindy, supra note 172.
176. 288 P. 1080, 1083 (Cal. 1930).
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such in all other areas of law. 17 But in time it became obvious that
the Friesen rule was unsound, followed only by a small minority of
less-than-stellar courts, and accordingly, it was overruled by the
court in Southern California Edison Co. v. Bourgerie'78
The alarming extent to which otherwise brilliant and revered
jurists could be induced to swallow condemnors' economic "parades
of horribles" is illustrated by Chief Justice Traynor's economic
misadventures, notably his dissent in Bacich v. Board of Control of
California,179 where he expressed his concern that awarding just
compensation for substantial impairment of access in partial takings
was likely to make the cost of freeways prohibitive and leave
California with only the two freeways existing at the time: the
Arroyo Seco Parkway (now the Pasadena Freeway) and a freeway in
San Rafael. 8 ° Of course, these hyperbolic concerns proved to be
overstated (to put it politely), and before long, the California freeway
network was measured in the thousands of miles, without any
untoward effects on the public treasury. In fact, in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, in spite of an ongoing, massive freeway building
program, annual surpluses in the state highway budgets ran into the
hundreds of millions of dollars.' 8'
That someone as bright and accomplished as Chief Justice
Traynor could be so easily taken in by condemnors' hyperbole is
quite remarkable because he was the one who wrote: "At the
slightest sign that judge-made law may move forward these bogus
defenders of stare decisis conjure up mythical dangers to alarm the
citizenry. They do sly injury to the law when the public takes them
seriously and timid judges retreat from painstaking analysis ... ,,1"2
It bears noting that by the time he thus criticized "timid judges"
easily intimidated by "bogus defenders of stare decisis" to such an
extent as to forego "painstaking analysis," it was all-too-obvious that
his own hyperbolic concerns, voiced twenty years earlier in Bacich,
177. Id. at 1083.
178. 507 P.2d 964, 968 (Cal. 1973).
179. 144 P.2d 818 (Cal. 1943).
180. Id. at 839.
181. See statistics collected in Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just
Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 765, 786 n.101 (1973).
182. Traynor, supra note 18, at 621.
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were unfounded. Nonetheless, he continued to cling to his clearly
unsound dissenting views."'
Chief Justice Traynor's intellectual misadventures were further
underscored by the economics of the Rodoni case. 114 There, the State
Division of Highways took the position that, by condemning excess
land (i.e., land in addition to what it intended to use for its highway),
it would convert a partial taking into a total taking and thereby save
money by forgoing its obligation to pay severance damages that its
partial taking would inflict on Roy Rodoni's remaining farmland,
which would become landlocked by the partial taking. The obvious
problem with that approach, as correctly pointed out in Justice
Mosk's dissent,185 was that by taking eighty-three times as much land
as it would actually use, the State could not possibly save money,
unless it meant to engage in the constitutionally forbidden practice of
recoupment, such as taking excess land with the intention of reselling
it at a profit.'86 As a matter of simple arithmetic, an entire parcel can
be worth only 100 percent of its value, so that by taking it all the
condemnor must necessarily pay the maximum amount possible,
inherently saving nothing and indeed paying more, not less, than for
a partial taking, since in partial takings the remainder parcel retains
some value even if landlocked (a condition in which it could be sold
by the condemnee to the neighbors, or to which access could be
provided by a private condemnation). 87
Still, Chief Justice Traynor was able to muster a majority of the
court for his unsound views, with only Justices Mosk and Peters
dissenting. 88 The majority thus went along with the condemnor's
deficient argument that it was protecting the fisc, paying scant
183. Breidert v. S. Pac. Co., 394 P.2d 719, 725 (Cal. 1964) (Traynor, C.J., concurring). As
Justice Traynor explained in his extrajudicial writing, concurring under compulsion of prior
precedent in which he dissented was a polite way of indicating that he still stuck to his dissenting
views. See Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U.
CHI. L. REv. 211, 219 (1957).
184. People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Superior Court (Rodoni), 436 P.2d 342 (Cal.
1968).
185. Id. at 350.
186. See, e.g., Robert E. Capron, Excess Condemnation in California-A Further Expansion
of the Right to Take, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 571, 585 n.73 (1969) (discussing excess condemnation,
the practice of taking more land than will be used for the public project); see also CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. § 1240.410 (West 2007) (limiting excess takings to useless remnants in partial
takings).
187. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1001 (1872) (amended 1976).
188. Rodoni, 436 P.2d at 349-52.
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attention to the economic absurdity inherent in its position (i.e., that
by taking more land, the condemnor would pay less compen-
sation).'89 As noted, economic reality eventually asserted itself when
a later Little Hoover Commission investigation revealed that Justice
Mosk was right and the majority wrong, and that far from "protecting
the fisc," the practice of excess condemnation resulted in the State
accumulating large amounts of useless land and produced huge net
losses.9 ° Why then was this course of action pursued by the State?
It turned out that, just as Justice Mosk suggested in his dissent,'9 ' the
State was using threats of excess condemnation to coerce prospective
condemnees into unfavorable settlements,'92 a matter that, though
conceded by the State, 3 was evidently of no concern to the court's
majority, thus again shedding an illuminating if oblique light on the
prevailing judicial attitude toward condemnees.
Though not quite as embarrassing as the excess condemnation
fiasco, a similar fate befell Justice Burke's dissent in Southern
California Edison Co. v. Bourgerie, where he lamented that allowing
compensation for takings of covenants running with the land would
result in large numbers of tenuous claims in future condemnation
cases. 94  In fact, in the quarter century that has elapsed since
Bourgerie was decided, there have been no reported appellate cases,
at least none known to me, litigating valuation of such covenants,
much less raising multiple large claims of that sort. Justice Burke's
concern thus proved to be fanciful.
A similar fate met the apprehensions voiced by Justice Edmonds
in his dissent in People v. Ricciardi,95 prophesying that the court's
decision allowing severance damages for substantial impairment of
access "will, in large measure, make the construction of necessary
highway improvements prohibitive in cost."' 96  A more recent
judicial performance of this sort was delivered in Agins v. City of
189. Id. at 344.
190. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 172.
191. 436 P.2d at 350.
192. See Capron, supra note 186, at 585 n.73, for the text of a coercive letter used by the
State in an effort to extort favorable settlements from condemnees on pain of taking excess land
from them.
193. 436 P.2d at 349.
194. 507 P.2d 964, 970 (Cal. 1973).
195. 144 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1943).
196. Id. at 807.
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Tiburon (Agins I),"97 an inverse condemnation case in which Justice
Richardson, speaking for the majority, voiced apprehensions that:
"If a governmental entity and its responsible officials were
held subject to a claim for inverse condemnation merely
because a parcel of land was designated for potential public
use on one of these several authorized plans, the process of
community planning would either grind to a halt, or
deteriorate to publication of vacuous generalizations
regarding the future use of land."
[T]he utilization of an inverse condemnation remedy
would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of police
regulatory powers at a local level because the expenditure
of public funds would be, to some extent, within the power
of the judiciary. "This threat of unanticipated financial lia-
bility will intimidate legislative bodies and will discourage
the implementation of strict or innovative planning
measures in favor of measures which are less stringent,
more traditional, and fiscally safe."' 98
As it happened, this statement was doubly wrong. First, the
"parade of horribles" conjured up by Justice Richardson,
apprehending liability on the basis of mere designation of private
property for future public use in land-use plans, had already been
aired by the court at length in Klopping v. City of Whittier'99 and
197. 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979).
198. Id. at 30 (quoting Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 514 P.2d 111, 117 (Cal.
1973); Barbara J. Hall, Note, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in Land
Use Law?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1569, 1597 (1977)), affd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980),
overruled by First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1987). Note that the courts never worry about being in control of
expenditure of public funds when they decide private tort claims against the government. It
should also be noted that the Agins plaintiffs did not contend that a taking of their land occurred
"merely" because their land had been designated for public use. There was a great deal more to it
than that. Id. at 30. They had been subjected to a complex, transparently bad-faith process that
eventually took over 30 years to overcome. See Philip Hager, Courting a Dream: 20-Year Fight
to Build Tiburon Home Not Over Yet, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1987, at 2 (Part I); Charles Gallardo,
Home OK'd but Not for Original Family, MARIN IND. J., Oct. 21, 1997, at 1.
199. 500 P.2d 1345, 1350 n.1 (Cal. 1972). The Agins plaintiffs' complaint was not merely
that their land had been designated for future acquisition. The City made extensively publicized
studies concluding that the Agins' parcel should be used for a public park, sold bonds for its
acquisition, and actually filed and then abandoned a condemnation action and adopted land use
regulations making economically reasonable use of the subject property a matter of municipal
discretion. Pursuit of non-monetary remedies would have been futile as demonstrated by
subsequent events. It took Ms. Agins $500,000 in expenditures required to meet the city's land-
use regulations and 30 years of litigation and negotiations to receive permission to build three
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Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura,2°° both concluding
that, au contraire, mere inclusion of a privately owned parcel of land
in future acquisition plans does not result in government liability.'
To give rise to such liability, the government must have a presently
discernible intent to acquire the subject land, and must conduct itself
unreasonably vis-cd-vis the prospective condemnee.0 2 Alternatively,
to face liability, the condemnor must reveal its intention to acquire
the subject property and then delay acquisition for an unreasonable
period of time, thus rendering the targeted property unattractive to
buyers or prospective users, with the threat of imminent
condemnation hanging over it.
Second, however arrived at, the Agins I holding (that a
compensatory remedy was not available) for which the above-quoted
passage provided a rationale, turned out to be simply wrong, and was
expressly overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles. °3
Justices of the California Supreme Court have not been the only
ones to gaze into the "clouded crystal ball." At times, Supreme
Court Justices too have revealed their ineptitude as prophets. For
example, in United States v. General Motors Corp.,2"4 Justice
Douglas lamented the prospects of "swollen verdicts" for moving
expenses, even in cases of temporary takings of leaseholds (where
the tenant has to move out and then move back in when the
condemnor takes a temporary "slice" out of an existing lease)." 5
Unchastened by experience that demonstrated the unsoundness of
houses on her five-acre parcel of land. Interview with Ms. Bonnie Agins, Plaintiff, Agins v. City
of Tiburon, in Tiburon, Cal. (1989), discussed above. Even that costly "half a loaf' relief came
only after the U.S. Supreme Court's 1987 First English decision that for the first time confronted
the city regulators with the prospect of having to pay compensation for their continued denial of
reasonable use of the Agins' parcel.
200. 514 P.2d 11, 115-16 (Cal. 1973).
201. Klopping, 500 P.2d at 1350 n.1; Selby Realty, 514 P.2d at 115-16.
202. See People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Peninsula Enter., Inc., 153 Cal. Rptr. 895, 907
(Ct. App. 1979). Whether the city's conduct in Agins met these liability criteria was, of course,
an issue of fact, but the court treated it as if it were an issue of law to be decided on demurrer,
without hearing any evidence.
203. 482 U.S. 304, 310-11 (1987) (holding that "the California courts have decided the
compensation question inconsistently with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment").
204. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
205. Id. at 385.
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such concerns, Justice Douglas repeated his hyperbolic performance
in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,0 6 where he lamented
that the Court's holding, requiring the payment of just compensation
to holders of secured liens in property of bankrupt railroads taken
over by the government, would produce multi-billion-dollar
liabilities." 7 Neither of Justice Douglas' concerns materialized.
Moving expenses are now routinely paid to displaced condeniees2°8
without any discernible effect on the construction of public works.
As for those fancied multi-billion-dollar liabilities that so worried
Justice Douglas in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases,
economic reality proved their insubstantiality. °9
Justice Black fared no better with his dissent in United States v.
Causby,1 ° where he decried an award for the inverse taking of an
avigation easement as an act of unwarranted judicial interference
with congressional power to regulate developing aviation.' Yet, as
we know, aviation has come a long way since 1942 when waves of
Army Air Corps bombers swooped at treetop level over Tom
Causby's farm in North Carolina, wreaking havoc on his chickens.
E. To the Barricades, Citizens!
When freeway plans were cancelled in California (and
elsewhere), it was not because of excessive cost of land, but because
of intense community resistance, poor planning, and illegal conduct
by the State. The best known instance of freeway plan cancellation
was San Francisco's "Freeway Revolt" in which freeway con-
struction was stopped in mid-project, leaving unfinished elevated
freeway stubs looming over parts of the city.1 2 Several other free-
ways were cancelled for similar reasons. In Los Angeles, there
206. 419 U.S. 102 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 180.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(1) (2000); CAL. GOv'T CODE § 7262(a)(1) (West 1995).
209. See generally In re Valuation Proceedings Under Sections 303(c) and 306 of the Reg'l
Rail Reorg. Act of 1973, 445 F. Supp. 994 (Reg.'l Rail Reorg. Act 1977) (recognizing the scrap
value of assets of a bankrupt railroad).
210. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
211. Id. at 275 (Black, J., dissenting).
212. Arthur R. Silen, Highway Location in California: The Federal Impact, 21 HASTINGS L.J.
781, 810 (1970); see BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: How
AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 45 (1991).
213. See, e.g., Jones v. People ex rel. Dep't of Transp., 583 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1978) (involving a
freeway cancellation in the Sacramento area); M.L. Gunzburg, Transportation Problems of the
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was also a judicially ordered major downscaling of the Century
Freeway brought about, not by any shortage of right-of-way
acquisition funds, but by the State's massive violations of
environmental and relocation assistance laws. 14 What sounded the
death knell for a number of planned California freeways was not a
lack of funds but, rather, Governor Jerry Brown's decision to allow
traffic conditions to worsen, in the mistaken hope that this would
drive Californians to use public transit. Brown's idea did not work
because, among other reasons, there was a lack of alternative means
of public transportation. Instead, what we got was increased traffic
congestion. 5
F. Chicken Little Goes to Court
Another instructive example of the unsoundness of the "risk to
the fisc" argument is provided by California airports that were
repeatedly called to account for the damage they inflicted on their
neighbors." 6 This despite the airports' vociferously voiced, though
disingenuous, lamentations of impending fiscal doom that would
surely follow if homeowners in areas surrounding them were to be
Megalopolitan, 12 UCLA L. REv. 800, 810 (1965) (describing the successful popular resistance
to the planned Beverly Hills Freeway); Irv Burleigh, Laurel Canyon: State Suspends Freeway
Studies, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1970, pt. 2, at 1 (describing the suspension of the proposed Laurel
Canyon Freeway due to resident opposition); Irv Burleigh, Councilmen Issue Warnings: Freeway
Protest Meeting Set, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1970, pt. 2, at 1 (discussing protest activities related to
the Laurel Canyon Freeway); Ray Hebert, Beverly Hills Freeway: To Limbo, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7,
1970, pt. 2, at D1 (discussing delays related to the Beverly Hills Freeway); No Urgency for
Whitnall Route, Report Shows, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 1974, at SF1 (describing opposition to the
Whitnall Freeway). The most determined resistance to a freeway, lasting for over 30 years, came
from South Pasadena's opposition to the extension of the 710 Freeway across its territory. See
City of South Pasadena v. Slater, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (C.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd sub nom. City of
South Pasadena v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2002); FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 212,
at 45 (canvassing urban highway stoppages in Baltimore, Memphis, Milwaukee, Seattle and San
Antonio among others). Compensation payable to the landowners in the path of these highways
had nothing to do with their cancellation. "The driving force behind the antihighway movement
was indignation, and people had good reason to be indignant." Id. at 46; see also id. at 49-50
(describing successful popular opposition to redevelopment and freeway construction in
Manhattan).
214. Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1350 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
215. Tom McClintock, Self-Inflicted Gridlock, 15 CAL. POL. REV. 13, 14 (2004); see Jeffrey
Rabin, Still Reigning Champ of Traffic Delays, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 19, 2007, at B.
216. See, e.g., Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866, 868 (Cal.
1985); Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 603 P.2d 1329, 1330
(Cal. 1979); Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 496 P.2d 480, 481-82 (Cal. 1972); Aaron v. City of
Los Angeles, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162, 164 (Ct. App. 1974); Drennen v. County of Ventura, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 907, 908 (Ct. App. 1974).
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compensated for the taking of avigation easements and for nuisance
inflicted on them by expanded jet airport operations. These lamen-
tations were pursued despite the fact that there was no indication that
the airports' acquisition of land necessary for their safe operation
was in jeopardy or impeded the development of commercial aviation
in this state. On the contrary, both the Los Angeles Airport ("LAX")
and the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena (now Bob Hope Airport) air-
ports proceeded with large-scale expansion plans, though in the
aftermath of 9/11 these plans have been scaled back, particularly in
Burbank (which originally intended to double its airport size), with
the only evident impediments being environmental concerns217 and
political infighting between the City of Burbank and the joint powers
airport authority. 18  The grandiose LAX expansion plans have
recently come to a halt for reasons described by the Los Angeles
Times, not as a lack of funds but as a "[l]ack of cohesive political
leadership, a history of mistrust between the city's airport agency
and nearby communities, grandiose visions for expanding the facility
and an incredibly complex planning process [that] have combined to
leave officials without a blueprint to modernize LAX. And time is
running out."'219
In fact, in the mid-1970s LAX proceeded with a massive land
acquisition (of some 17,500 acres) in the high desert area near
Palmdale in north Los Angeles County, ostensibly to establish a new,
grandly named "Intercontinental" airport, which was an utter failure
that was at best sporadically used by a few small, short-hop airlines
that eventually terminated their operations there after trying to make
a go of it.220
Nonetheless, even as LAX's large-scale airport expansion and
land acquisition plans were being carried out in the 1970s, the
217. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. Hensler, 284 Cal. Rptr. 498, 596 (Ct. App.
1991).
218. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d
28 (Ct. App. 1999) (airport authority challenged state statute allowing a city to review its
development plans).
219. Jennifer Oldham, Major Revamp of LAX Stuck at the Gate, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 10, 2007, at
B 1; see also David Zahniser, Regional Airport Network Falls Flat, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 6, 2007, at
B1 ("A panel resurrected by L.A. Mayor Villaraigosa makes little headway in developing
alternatives in expansion at LAX.").
220. T.W. McGarry, An Airport Waiting to Happen; Desert "Superport" to Ease LAX Traffic
Is 2-Decade Dream, L.A. TIMES (Valley Edition), May 2, 1988, pt. 2, at 8; Sharon Moeser,
SkyWest Plans to Pull Out ofPalmdale, L.A. TIMES (Valley Edition), Dec. 16, 1993, at B9.
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airport's lawyers pulled off what may have been the most widely
publicized parade-of-horribles publicity stunt in California legal
history. On May 2, 1972, the (now defunct) Los Angeles Herald-
Examiner ran a front-page banner headline: "L.A. AIRPORT
FACES SHUTDOWN IN 30 DAYS, ' 22' reporting that unless the
California Supreme Court immediately granted a rehearing in its
then-brand-new decision in Nestle v. Santa Monica,222 and reversed
itself on its ruling that California airports could be held liable to their
residential neighbors for nuisance, LAX would be shut down. In
private conversations with my colleague, Michael M. Berger, and
me, the airport's lawyer made no bones over the fact that this story
was instigated through the airport's public relations connections. Of
course, the headline and the story behind it were as phony as the
proverbial three-dollar bill. LAX was in no danger of shutting down
because of similar judgments against it. Apart from its ample
revenue stream, it had an arrangement with the airlines that were
using the airport whereby they would reimburse LAX for such
payouts through rents and landing fees. 24  Second, and more
important, any shutdown of LAX would stop the airport's cash flow
and force a default on the city's revenue bonds, with calamitous
consequences to the city's credit standing and the interest rates it
would have to pay for any future bonded indebtedness.
Thus, practically speaking, the shutdown of LAX would have
been economically suicidal to the city. Of course, the city had no
intention of shutting down LAX and made no effort to do so when
the California Supreme Court ignored this clumsy attempt at
intimidation and denied rehearing in Nestle.
Still, the LAX story is worth retelling because it illustrates, as
few others do, the extent to which government functionaries are
willing to go, in the belief that courts can be stampeded by municipal
"poor mouth" cries of impending insolvency, no matter how
221. For an actual copy of that headline, see Michael M. Berger, The California Supreme
Court-A Shield Against Governmental Overreaching: Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 9 CAL.
W. L. REv. 199, 245 (1973). For a fuller discussion of the local airports' unsuccessful public
relations campaign, see id. at 245-52.
222. 496 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1972).
223. Id. at 480 (holding that government-operated airports were not immune to charges that
their operations constituted a nuisance with regard to surrounding land).
224. See City of Los Angeles v. Japan Air Lines Co., 116 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (Ct. App. 1974).
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improbable or even false. 225 These are not irrational people, and they
operate on the premise that, whether true or not, some of their
lamentations will have the desired impact on the judiciary-if only in
terms of fostering a judicial attitude of suspicion directed at
condemnees whose compensatory demands are said to threaten the
public fisc.
Apart from such government mummery, the problem is broader
than just the shortcomings of eminent domain compensation law and
practices standing in isolation. Rather, as noted, it is one that
becomes egregious in its lack of even-handedness when juxtaposed
with other fields of law-notably tort law-that, insofar as it
involves torts against property, is closely analogous to inverse
condemnation. It is a watchword of the American tort law reform
movement that awards of damages in tort cases are out of control,
that excessive punitive damages are being recklessly awarded by the
courts in situations that do not warrant them, that in class actions
they enrich lawyers without producing commensurate or even
significant benefits for individual class members, and that they
increasingly constitute an unjustified economic burden on American
private and commercial life.226 Some of these concerns may be
overstated, but others are not.
This is no place to debate the virtues and shortcomings of
modern American tort law, but it is appropriate to take note of and
deplore the invidious disparity of treatment of condemnees, as
compared to tort plaintiffs whose property has been trespassed upon,
damaged, or otherwise interfered with. Some of the contrasts
between the two compensation systems are so glaring that they
cannot go without note. To reemphasize, in tort law, courts
recognize that "[t]he collateral source rule [that allows multiple
recoveries for the same harm] partially serves to compensate for the
attorney's share [of the award] and does not actually render 'double
225. Nor was the LAX caper the only such government "chicken little" performance.
Following United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 383 (1945) (awarding moving
expenses under limited circumstances), the Justice Department lawyer who lost that case
prophesied in a speech to the Nassau County (New York) Bar Association that thereafter
condemnations of private property for needed public improvement would be impossible. Note,
'Just Compensation 'for the Small Businessman, 2 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 144, 148 n.41
(1966).
226. JAMES R. COPLAND ET AL., MANHATTAN INST. CTR. FOR LEGAL POLICY, TRIAL
LAWYERS INC.: A REPORT ON THE LAWSUIT INDUSTRY IN AMERICA 2003, at 2-9 (2003),
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/triallawyersinc.pdf.
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recovery' for the plaintiff." '227 In contrast, in eminent domain cases,
condemnees cannot use any part of the damages to compensate their
attorneys, appraisers, and other essential expert witnesses without
diminishing their narrowly circumscribed compensatory damages.
Thus, even in cases they win on the merits, condemnees' net
recovery inherently falls short of compensating them even once for
the theoretically compensable economic harm inflicted on them.
Even acknowledging the need for injured tort plaintiffs to
recover adequate, or even generous, economic damages for their
injuries and their consequences, there is no moral justification for
courts to engage in, or tolerate, multiple recoveries or feats of
profligacy with tort defendants' money, while at the same time
conjuring up unwarranted visions of imminent government
insolvency should condemnees receive genuinely just compensatory
awards even once for all their demonstrable economic losses
concededly inflicted on them when their homes and businesses are
taken and destroyed to benefit society at large. And it is not a case of
judicial overprotection of the government; it's a case of
underprotection of condemnees. For in personal injury tort cases
against the government, the California Supreme Court has taken the
position that liberal imposition of liability on government defendants
is a good thing because it tends to provide disincentives to wrongful
conduct by government functionaries.228
Thus, in Baldwin v. State,229 the California Supreme Court was
faced with an attack on precedents narrowly construing section 830.6
of the California Government Code, which provides the so-called
design immunity defense under which liability for personal injury is
denied where a harm-causing public improvement is built pursuant to
an approved design.23° Predictably, the defendant responded to the
injured party's claim by raising the familiar bankruptcy specter that
often works in eminent domain cases. But Baldwin was not such a
case, and the court's response was very different:
227. Helfand v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 68 (Cal. 1970). If a tort plaintiff gets
to collect damages for the same harm from more than one party, what is it if not multiple recovery
for the same harm? What else could it be?
228. Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 359-61 (Cal. 1968); see also City of Santa Barbara v.
Superior Court (Janeway), 161 P.3d 1095, 1129-30 (Cal. 2007).
229. 491 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1972).
230. Id. at 1129.
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We are met, however, by the contention that a narrow
interpretation of design immunity will bankrupt public
entities by forcing them to spend vast sums of money to
update hazardous or obsolescent public improvements. We
unhesitatingly reject this contention because we find that
the Legislature has adequately protected public entities
against crippling financial burdens. 3'
The moral problem is particularly acute in redevelopment cases
where the condemnation avowedly produces no genuine public
works. In reality, these condemnations inherently confer large
economic benefits on politically well-connected developers as well
as their tenants and vendees, who--even assuming that their self-
serving commercial exertions produce collateral public benefits-get
to consume a "free lunch" at the expense of condemnees and the
public fisc.232 In other words, even if we assume that commercial
redevelopment is permissible as a "public use," that does not address
the question of fairness of compensation, particularly where the
taking destroys condemnees' businesses so that redevelopers can use
the taken land for businesses of their own.
233
In sum, the judicial jeremiads conjuring up visions of a helpless
government unable to provide the people with needed public works if
full and fair compensation-just compensation-were to be awarded
in eminent domain cases to people displaced by public works, are
transparently unfounded or insincere because they are not only
factually unsupported, they are also directly contrary to judicial
attitudes in other types of cases. Thus, in Connor v. Great Western
Savings & Loan Ass 'n,234 the court was faced with another parade of
horribles in the form of an argument by the savings and loan
industry. The argument urged that allowing recovery for defective
231. Id. (emphasis added). The Court went on to note that before 1963 California law
provided no such immunity, yet public entities had not experienced mass bankruptcies. Id. at
1130.
232. For a description of egregious examples, see John Gibeaut, The Money Chase, 85 A.B.A.
J. 58, 59 (1999), particularly the Fort Worth Speedway sweetheart deal, wherein the city paid out
some $129 million in subsidies and tax abatements on a deal that involved a 30-year lease at the
end of which the lessee-redeveloper can acquire the property for $500,000. See also Kelo, where
the city's plan called for the private redeveloper getting a 99-year lease on a 90-acre waterfront
parcel for the rent of $1 per year. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 476 n.4 (2005).
233. Dean Starkman, Take and Give: Condemnation Is Used to Hand One Business Property
ofAnother, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998, at Al.
234. 447 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1968).
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home construction against lending institutions that financed the
construction and exercised control over it would cause thrift
institutions to shun California, depriving its residents of needed
housing capital.235 The court's response was short and blunt: "These
are conjectural claims. 236  The author of that opinion was Chief
Justice Traynor.
Bottom line: (a) Full and fair compensation to condemnees for
all their demonstrable economic losses would only give substance to
the constitutional "just compensation" command; (b) confronting
condemnors with the natural economic consequences of their
unilateral and largely unreviewable decisions to condemn land for
projects of their own design, would not deter construction of needed
public works237-judicial "Chicken Little" dramaturgy notwith-
standing; and (c) such a compensation regime would still provide a
substantially lesser measure of damages payable to condemnees than
is routinely, and in some cases eagerly, provided by the courts to
plaintiffs in tort cases.
VII. FEES-IT ALL DEPENDS ON
THE CLAIMANT'S POLITICAL CORRECTNESS
When it comes to attorneys' fees, with the exception of
Florida, 38 the black letter rule is that, in eminent domain cases, the
fees of attorneys, appraisers, and other experts that condemnees must
retain to refute condemnors' inadequate offers and to prove their own
case, are not compensable 239 unless authorized by statute. The
conventional wisdom justification of this rule is that, under the so-
called "American rule," litigants in tort and contract cases likewise
235. See id. at 618.
236. Id. The California legislature codified the Connor liability rule, with no effect on
availability of housing finance capital. See also the extended discussion of the history of the
parade-of-horribles defense in tort law in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1968).
237. As pointedly noted by Justice Kourlis of the Colorado Supreme Court, "[a]ny balancing
of interests should be conducted by the condemning entity prior to deciding whether to condemn
a private individual's land for a public purpose-not after the decision has been made and the
economic consequences of that decision are brought to bear [on condemnees]." E-470 Pub.
Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 91 P.3d 1038, 1050 (Colo. 2004) (Kourlis, J., dissenting).
238. Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602, 604 (Fla. 1950).
239. See United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 204 (1979); County of Los Angeles v.
Ortiz, 490 P.2d 1142, 1147 (Cal. 1971).
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are not entitled to recover attorneys' fees.240 But that justification is
fallacious. In tort cases, even without the benefit of the collateral
source rule, successful plaintiffs routinely recover subjective non-
economic damages that enable them to pay their attorneys and
experts while retaining the full amount of their compensatory
economic damages. In contrast, in eminent domain law, there is no
such thing as non-economic damages. Instead, in order to pay their
litigation expenses, condemnees must give up a part of their
compensatory award that, in theory, is supposed to be a substitute for
their taken property.24' Similarly, in contract cases, parties can and
often do provide, by agreement, that in case of litigation over the
terms or performance of the contract, the winner gets to recover
litigation expenses. Even when one party to a contract imposes an
obligation to pay attorneys' fees on the other contracting party, the
law makes the obligation mutual.242
In County of Los Angeles v. Ortiz,43 involving the taking of
modest homes on Los Angeles's downscale east side, the California
Supreme Court expressed sympathy for "small landowner[s]" who
are put to a Hobson's choice of either accepting the condemnor's
inadequate, below-market offer, or absorbing the expense of liti-
gation that in such small cases is likely to erode or consume the
small equity in the homes that are being taken.244  The Ortiz
condemnees thus urged that the rule denying them litigation
expenses on such facts was de facto depriving them of their
constitutionally guaranteed required just compensation. They sought
reimbursement of their appraisers' fees. The Ortiz court declined to
address that constitutional argument, holding instead that awarding
litigation expenses was a matter of policy "distinguished from
constitutional dimension" so that "determination of costs which are
permissibly recoverable remains with the Legislature rather than the
240. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West 2007); see also Sam Andrews' Sons v. Agric.
Labor Relations Bd., 763 P.2d 881, 890-91 (Cal. 1988).
241. See Barry L. Friedman, Attorneys' Fees in Condemnation Proceedings, 20 HASTINGS
L.J. 694, 696 (1969) (noting that the fear of litigation costs and attorneys' fees compels many
condemnees to accept a condemnor's initial purchase offer, even if the offer amounts to less than
just compensation).
242. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717 (West 1998).
243. 490 P.2d 1142 (Cal. 1971).
244. Id. at 1147 n.8.
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courts.' 245  This holding left no doubt that the court viewed the
power to award litigation expenses as legislative, which necessarily
rendered the judiciary unable to award fees under the separation of
powers doctrine.246
But in Serrano v. Priest,247 a non-condemnation case, the
judicial power to award litigation expenses (said in Ortiz to be
legislative) materialized out of thin air,248 enabling the same court to
award litigation expenses to an evidently more politically correct
plaintiff who attacked as unconstitutional the then prevailing method
of public school financing through local property taxes. The court
sought to justify its position by asserting that, in Serrano, it was
invoking an exception to the prevailing rule and was vindicating
important, beneficial, constitutional rights.249  But the doctrinal
problem with that excuse was that, in Ortiz, the court had held that
the courts lacked power to award litigation expenses because it was a
non-constitutional legislative policy matter.25 ° Therefore, held Ortiz,
the court could not provide relief despite its sympathy for the plight
of small property owners forced to accept less than the
constitutionally required "just compensation.
251
I am at a loss to understand how in Serrano the non-existent
judicial power to award litigation expenses could materialize out of
thin air as an exception to its absence. Whatever its contours, the
courts either do or do not have that power, and if they do not (as held
in Ortiz), that is the end of the matter. Moreover, if the power to
award litigation expenses is a legislative policy question (as also held
in Ortiz), then it cannot be exercised judicially because, under the
California Constitution, such an "exception" would violate the
separation of powers doctrine. Powers properly exercised by one
branch of government may not be exercised by another branch.252
245. Id. at 1147 (emphasis added).
246. See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.
247. 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977).
248. See id. at 1315.
249. Id. at 1312-15.
250. 490 P.2d at 1147 ("[S]ince allowable costs are of policy as distinguished from consti-
tutional dimension, determination of costs which are permissibly recoverable remains with the
Legislature rather than the courts.").
251. See id.
252. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.
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In short, in Serrano, the court declared itself to be "a little bit
pregnant." Though in Ortiz the court said that it lacks the power to
make the policy decision to award litigation expenses, it held in
Serrano that [sometimes] it does. The court also left an important
question unanswered: If this now-you-see-it-now-you-don't judicial
power to award litigation expenses may be properly invoked in cases
where citizens' constitutional rights are at stake and an award of
litigation expenses fosters the public interest, as in Serrano, what
about citizens' constitutional rights to receive just compensation?
Are those rights chopped liver? Why should condemnees' conceded
constitutional rights receive lesser judicial protection than the rights
of other litigants? And wouldn't a rule assuring genuine "just
compensation" ostensibly required by the Constitution promote the
public interest that, one would hope, encompasses more than
condemnors' ability to acquire private property on the cheap?
Surely, the court owed us some sort of explanation, but it offered
none. Ortiz is not even mentioned, much less distinguished, in
Serrano.
An even more egregious bit of invidious judicial discrimination,
also with regard to litigation expenses, occurred in the court's
treatment of legislation awarding litigation expenses to successful
inverse condemnees. In Holtz v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid
Transit District,253  a property owner who won his inverse
condemnation case sought an award of litigation expenses under a
statute providing for recovery of "reasonable costs, disbursements,
and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and
engineering fees, actually incurred." '254 The court held that, under
this statutory language, the owner could only recover litigation
expenses incurred in the trial court but not those incurred on appeal
because the legislature did not explicitly so provide.25
But compare Holtz with Morcos v. Board of Retirement.256
There, a successful plaintiff in a non-condemnation case sought
253. 552 P.2d 430 (Cal. 1976).
254. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1246.3 (West 1972), repealed by Act effective July 1, 1976, §
8, 1975 Cal. Stat. 3164 (codified at CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1036 (West 2007)); Holtz, 552 P.2d
at 432-33.
255. Holtz, 552 P.2d at 437.
256. 800 P.2d 543 (Cal. 1990).
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recovery of litigation expenses under a similar statute257 but was
denied fees on appeal by the California Court of Appeal, which
reasoned, a la Holtz, that had the legislature intended to award
litigation expenses incurred on appeal, it would have so provided. 58
But this time, unlike in Holtz, the California Supreme Court
indignantly rejected such a narrow construction of the statute. Said
the court (quoting with approval): "[I]t is established that fees, if
recoverable at all-pursuant either to statute or parties' agreement-
are available for services at trial and on appeal."'259
But not so fast, argued the Board of Retirement. What about the
Holtz case? 260 Didn't the court hold the opposite there-that unless
expressly so provided by the legislature, attorney fees incurred on
appeal are not recoverable under a statute that provides for recovery
of litigation expenses? The court brushed that argument aside,
confessing that, to put it plainly, it had done a poor job in Holtz
where, it confessed, it "did not analyze or even refer to the great
number of cases discussed above which embody the general rule that
statutory attorney fee provisions are interpreted to apply to attorney
fees on appeal unless the statute specifically provides otherwise. '"261
So having thus conceded that Holtz was not only wrongly decided
but, also, a shoddy bit of judicial handiwork that had ignored
controlling precedent, did the court overrule it? Hardly. Said the
court: "We have no occasion in this case to determine the continued
validity of Holtz with regard to the proper interpretation of
. . . the statute governing the recovery of attorney fees in inverse
condemnation actions." '262 That, said the court, "would require
consideration of the proper demands and limits of the principle of
stare decisis. 263 What stare decisis? Morcos plainly held that Holtz
had been wrongly decided. What force then was retained in the
concededly erroneous Holtz holding? Why did the court impose on
257. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 31536 (West 1988).
258. See Morcos, 800 P.2d at 545.
259. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Serrano v. Unruh, 652 P.2d 985, 995 (Cal. 1982)).
260. See id. at 546.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 546 n.7.
263. Id. The problem was eventually solved by the California Legislature, which amended
section 1036 of the California Code of Civil Procedure to provide for an award of appellate fees
to successful inverse condemnees, as was the legislative intention all along. Act enacted July 24,
1995, § 1, 1995 Cal. Stat. c. 181.
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successful future inverse condemnees the Herculean task of
persuading lower courts to disregard a California Supreme Court
precedent that the court itself expressly refused to overrule in spite of
its deficiencies?
VIII. BIGOTRY-SOME ANIMALS ARE LESS EQUAL THAN OTHERS
Finally, an insight into how condemnees can be treated in
California courts that speaks for itself: In Redevelopment Agency v.
Thrifty Oil Co.,2" the issues involved valuation of the business
goodwill of a condemnee's service station (made compensable in
1976 by section 1263.510 of the California Code of Civil Procedure).
Under California practice, both sides are required to submit and
exchange their appraisal reports before trial,265 and in this case the
condemnor's report showed a goodwill value of $80,00.166 But,
having thus led the condemnee to believe that this would be the
condemnor's evidence, at trial condemnor's counsel sprung a
surprise-he refused to present any evidence of the value of
goodwill, asserting that it was worthless in spite of the condemnor's
own appraiser's five-figure valuation. The trial court acquiesced in
this ploy, in spite of the fact that (a) preexisting decisional law was to
the contrary; and (b) condemnor's counsel (a lawyer, not a business
appraiser) was unqualified to express any valuation opinion. His
assertions of no value were not only incompetent but also unsworn,
and thus were no evidence at all, so that the only evidence of value
was the condemnee's. 267 The condemnee's counsel then moved for a
directed verdict on the value of the goodwill, reasoning that the
owner's valuation (of $125,000) was now the only evidence of
goodwill value before the court, and therefore the trier of fact would
be required to bring in a verdict neither higher nor lower than the
only goodwill valuation evidence before it.268 The trial court denied
264. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687 (Ct. App. 1992).
265. For a discussion of the origins of this practice and of problems with the application of
the appraisal exchange process in the courts, see Sic Transit Gloria, supra note 69, at 452.
266. Thrifty Oil, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690.
267. See id.
268. The California Evidence Code provides that value may only be shown by opinion
testimony of qualified witnesses. CAL. EVID. CODE § 813 (Deering 2004); see Aetna Life & Cas.
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 216 Cal. Rptr. 831, 876-78 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding that a directed
verdict was proper where the inverse condemnor failed to present an opinion of value and relied
solely on its cross-examination of the owner's appraiser, precisely the situation in Thrifty Oil).
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the motion. Unaware of the condemnor's appraiser's conceded
$80,000 figure, the jury awarded only $67,500.269 On appeal, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling and held that the
directed verdict on goodwill was properly denied because the jury
could have disbelieved the owner's appraiser, notwithstanding that
his was the only competent evidence of goodwill value.27° But
compare what happened where the shoe was on the other foot, and
the jury disbelieved the condemnor's appraisal witness and brought
in a verdict higher than that evidence supported.271 In McCullough,
the appellate court had no difficulty reversing that verdict.
The Thrifty Oil court's refusal to follow precedent acquires a
particularly unfortunate cast because there, in the midst of trial, the
trial judge told an anti-Semitic joke from the bench to the jury
(making the condemnee's counsel, who was Jewish, the butt of it).
The point of the joke was that Jews (symbolized by the joke's
protagonist, Mrs. Goldberg) are vulgar, greedy, and given to
excessive gesticulation with their hands.272
THE COURT: "Before we do [take a break], you notice
that all of us, all the attorneys and Mr. Tennenbaum-and
me-we use our hands a lot.127 31 And [that] reminds me of a
story.
"Mrs. Goldberg goes to the Jeweler and she says I want
a ring for every finger and I want a different gem on each
one of the rings, a diamond, a jade, and all different kinds,
and a pearl and all different kinds of rings.
269. Thrifty Oil, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690.
270. Id. at 690-92.
271. People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. McCullough, 223 P.2d 37, 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)
(jury may not disregard evidence of value and award more than the highest opinion of value).
Also, a jury may not bring in a verdict for less than the lowest evidence of value. See Redev.
Agency of Sacramento v. Modell, 2 Cal. Rptr. 245, 248-49 (Ct. App. 1960).
272. The transcript of that "joke" appears in the Appellant's Opening Brief at 45 n. 35,
Redev. Agency v. Thrifty Oil Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687 (Ct. App. 1992) (No. B046338).
273. Mr. Tennenbaum was the owners' business appraiser. There was no indication in the
record that any of this was true. This statement was also puzzling because there was nothing in
the record to suggest that the body language of condemnee's counsel or anyone else was in any
way inappropriate or noteworthy. Nonetheless, shortly before telling his "joke," the trial judge,
for no evident reason, admonished the condemnees' counsel out of the blue, "[Y]ou don't have to
use your hands that much." Id. at 45. Significantly, condemnor's counsel, who had an Irish last
name, was not so admonished and, of course, the trial judge's "joke" starred Mrs. Goldberg, not
Mrs. Murphy. So much for "all... the attorneys... and me-we use our hands a lot." Id.
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"And [the] Jeweler says, Mrs. Goldberg, that's going to
cost you a lot of money. You really want that? She says
yes, you go right ahead and do it.
"So Mrs. Goldberg leaves the store and the Jeweler
goes ahead and makes all those wonderful rings and she
comes, Mrs. Goldberg comes in, and I have your rings
ready for you, Mrs. Goldberg.
"And she puts them on, she puts the diamond on and
goes like this, she puts on the pearl and puts it like this, puts
them on, but each ring she turns over like this, and the pearl
she turns it over like this and put it here (each stone turned
[to the] palm of the hand).
"The Jeweler says, Mrs. Goldberg, you spent all of this
money for these rings and you cannot wear those rings with
the jewels like this.
"So she says, why not (Gesturing with palms up). 274
On appeal, the appellate court did not think that this claim of
prejudicial conduct on the part of the trial judge required any
discussion, 275 and affirmed. The California Supreme Court denied
review.
Compare this judicial conduct in Thrifty Oil with how California
courts react to questionable judicial ethnic and gender expressions in
other types of cases. In In re Marriage of Iverson,276 the trial judge
was chastised and his judgment reversed in a published appellate
opinion because he referred to the wife in a marital dissolution trial
as "a lovely girl" and found that it was she, not her husband, who
pressed for marriage because, as the judge put it, "why. .. buy the
cow when you get the milk free. 277 Significantly, the appellate court
found that the trial judge was not biased against the wife specifically,
but the judgment would have to be reversed anyway because of his
274. Id. (first alteration in original). I leave it to the readers to assess whether this joke was
funny. My own view is that it was not, and in any event it was ethnically offensive and singularly
inappropriate to be told by a judge to a jury in the midst of trial, particularly after having
improperly admonished the condemnee's counsel in front of the jury about the use of his hands.
As the court put it in Etzel v. Rosenbloom, "The trial of a lawsuit is a serious matter, and the
courtroom is not the forum in which the buffoon should ascend the bench to display his wares."
189 P.2d 848, 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
275. See Thrifty Oil, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 694.
276. 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 70 (Ct. App. 1992).
277. Id. at 72.
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display of generalized bias against women that constituted an
appearance of lack of judicial impartiality.278
See also the travails that befell another California trial judge
who admonished an unruly African-American defendant to answer
questions put to him, and when things calmed down said, "Good
boy. ' 279 The judge was ordered disqualified for saying that though
he was eventually exonerated .2 " But the fates were not as kind to
another California judge who was displeased by the legal argument
of a Japanese-American lawyer appearing before him and
sarcastically inquired if counsel was relying on "Upper Tokyo
Reports." For that he found himself the subject of formal discipli-
nary proceedings and an official reproval.2 '
What is one to make of the juxtaposition of these events? Why
would the Thrifty Oil's trial judge's disparaging ethnic "joke"-told
from the bench to the jury in mid-trial-receive greater judicial
solicitude than the other comparatively minor incidents of judicial
ethnic insensitivity? I leave to others the question whether this
incident suggests that California courts are more tolerant of judicial
displays of anti-Semitism than of other forms of ethnic bigotry or
insensitivity. I, for one, doubt that very much. But if not that, the
conclusion seems inescapable that California courts-in this instance
three levels of courts-did exhibit anti-condemnee bias or, if you
prefer, an unacceptable level of insensitivity to their treatment that is
found intolerable in other kinds of court proceedings. If any of my
readers have an alternative explanation, I hope they will share it with
me.
IX. SUMMING UP
It was said of the Holy Roman Empire that it was neither holy,
nor Roman, nor an empire. In like vein, it can be said of eminent
domain law requiring payment of "just compensation" upon taking
278. Id.; see also Catchpole v. Brannon, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 440 passim (Ct. App. 1995)
(discussing indications of lack of judicial impartiality manifested through a trial judge's
impatience and belittling of a female litigant).
279. Philip Carrizosa, Judge Rebuked for Insensitive Racial Remark, L.A. DAILY J., May 31,
1995, at 1.
280. Flier v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383, 387-88 (Ct. App. 1994); Edward
Robinson, Judges Remark Not Racist, Court Rules, S.F. DAILY J., Mar. 17, 1994, at 1.
281. Charles Finnie, Alameda Judge Is Publicly Reproved, S.F. DAILY J., Apr. 12, 1994, at 1.
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of private property for public use that the use need not be public and
the compensation is not just.
The answer to the question put to me (do property owners in
takings cases receive harsher treatment by the courts than do other
litigants seeking vindication of other Bill of Rights provisions?) is
clearly in the affirmative. Why that is so is, of course, the real
question. The short and most likely correct answer is that for all the
pious talk about judicial independence, judges tend to deemphasize
the other "I-word"-impartiality-and in eminent domain cases look
upon themselves as a part of the government establishment duty-
bound to keep condemnation awards down. As the California
Supreme Court conceded, there exists a closeness between trial
judges and local government officials acting as condemnors that
affects judicial impartiality, at least to the extent of justifying a
change of venue when the condemnees are "outsiders." '282 The courts
have also repeatedly confessed that instead of being scrupulously
impartial in eminent domain cases, they tend to guard against the
mythical "embargo" by deliberately keeping condemnation awards
down. 83 Thus, the courts are not impartial; they avowedly side with
condemnors whose fiscal well being they perceive as superior to
citizens' economic interests and their constitutional right to be justly
compensated when their property is taken.
In recent years this problem has grown more acute in California
and elsewhere, as more new judges come from the ranks of
government counsel.284 This is not to say that judges who are former
government lawyers are necessarily unduly biased against
condemnees, but it would be denying reality to disregard the verity
that people's perceptions of the world in which they function are
282. Garrett v. Superior Court, 520 P.2d 968, 969-970 (Cal. 1974).
283. See People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Symons, 357 P.2d 451, 455 (Cal. 1960)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting People v. Gianni, 20 P.2d 87, 89 (Cal. Ct. App.
1933)).
284. The late Chief Justice Rehnquist took note of this phenomenon in his 2000 State of the
Judiciary statement. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., 2000 YEAR-
END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2001), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/
year-end/2000year-endreport.html. More recently, Chief Justice Roberts echoed these concerns
by pointing out in his 2007 State of the Judiciary statement that fewer than 40 percent of new
federal district judges come from the private sector, observing that "[ilt changes the nature of the
federal judiciary when judges are no longer drawn primarily from among the best lawyers in the
practicing bar." Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Advocates Higher Pay for Judiciary, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at A14.
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shaped to a large extent by experiences of their formative
professional years. It should thus not come as a surprise that many
former career government lawyers who have excelled in their jobs
sufficiently to be appointed to the bench bring with them a generally
positive attitude toward their [former] client-employers-and a
corresponding skepticism toward claims of their lifelong adversaries.
This is not merely my view. Former California Deputy Attorney
General Richard Frank took note of this increasingly prevailing
government background of California judges when he noted, with
obvious relish, that
[G]overnment attorneys can take considerable comfort from
the fact that when issues of special significance to the
Public Law Section [of the State Bar] and its members do
find their way to the [California Supreme] Court, the
Justices will bring to their deliberations the shared
experience derived from literally decades of public law
service and practice. After all, before they were members
of California's highest court, each of the current justices
served a distinguished career as a public lawyer.285
Another, albeit partial, explanation is historical, rooted in
nineteenth-century railroad land acquisition practices which
dominated the country's first wave of mass land condemnations and
set an unjustified but enduring legal-cultural tone that has shaped
subsequent developments in eminent domain law to a surprising
extent. As Professor Scheiber put it: "Many of the [nineteenth
century] courts went beyond their legislatures in fashioning a law of
eminent domain that reduced the obligation to pay for takings."286
They did so by "narrow[ing] drastically the very concept of a
'compensable taking' so as to exclude altogether nearly all forms of
consequential, incidental, or indirect damages." '87 It was, in short, an
285. Richard Frank, The California Supreme Court-A Tribunal of Public Lawyers, 20 PUB.
LAW. 1-2 (1996).
286. Scheiber, Private Property, supra note 118, at 19; see Risinger, supra note 103, at 491-
95; see also Comment, supra note 100, at 66-67. See generally Harry N. Scheiber, Property
Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: The United States, 1789-1910, 33
J. EcoN. HIST. 232, 237-40 (1973) [hereinafter Scheiber, Property Law] (explaining that, because
few of the early state constitutions had explicit definitions of eminent domain, it largely fell to the
courts to develop states' powers and limitations).
287. Harry N. Scheiber, The "Takings" Clause and the Fifth Amendment: Original Intent and
Significance in American Legal Development, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND
CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 233, 242 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991).
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era during which the robber barons got to run roughshod over
condemnees with judicial acquiescence, if not encouragement.
During the railroad construction era, it was often the case that
unsophisticated farmers were induced or pressured to give land to
railroads gratis, on the theory that the coming railroads would bring
about general prosperity. However, the railroads often failed to
deliver any such prosperity,288 bringing instead noise, smoke, and
fires in farm buildings and haystacks near railroad rights-of-way,
caused by sparks emitted by early wood-burning locomotives. As
time went on and the rosy prognostications of railroad promoters
gave way to harsh realities, and as property owners started to demand
realistic just compensation when their increasingly valuable land was
taken, they were seen as "mean and stingy," to use Sherman's
characterization.8 9
That this should have occurred is deplorable but not entirely
surprising. For one thing, at the time, land was cheap and substitute
land was readily available. More important, takings were then
mostly of right-of-way easements across vacant land so that few
condemnees were actually displaced from their homes and fewer still
suffered significant noncompensable incidental losses.29 ° Thus, the
impact of takings was not as severe as it has been in modern times,
288. See JOHN SHERMAN, JOHN SHERMAN'S RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS IN THE
HOUSE, SENATE AND CABINET 81-82 (The Werner Co. 1895).
289. Id. at 82. Significantly, by the time Sherman wrote in 1895, he had to concede that land
values had risen and property owners were no longer interested in just giving their land to the
railroads. Still, those who meant to receive their constitutionally promised "just compensation"
were looked upon with disfavor. Later, the railroads resorted to a racket whereby in partial
takings of rights of way they presented evidence that the benefits anticipated from railroad
operations would be so great that the value of the owner's remaining land in its after condition
would be greater than the value of the entire parcel in its before condition, thus entitling the
condemnee to no compensation at all. When this ploy succeeded, the owners were paid nothing
for the taking. When it failed, the railroads could and often did dismiss their condemnation
actions and refile them later, hoping for a lower verdict this time, a practice described in City of
Los Angeles v. Abbott, 17 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1932). See generally Scheiber, Property Law, supra
note 286, at 237-38 n.20 (listing several states in which the offsetting of benefits led to
insignificant awards for condemnees). The California Judiciary did nothing to curb such abuses
of the judicial process, and it was not until 1872 that the California Legislature put an end to this
practice by enacting section 1248(3) of the California Code of Civil Procedure (later repealed and
replaced by section 1263.410(b)), which required payment at least for the part taken. See Note,
Benefits and Just Compensation in California, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 764, 771 (1969). This practice
was further limited by the enactment of section 1255a(c) (later repealed and replaced by section
1273.040), which provided for the payment of attorneys' fees upon abandonment of a
condemnation action, thus putting an end to the railroads' practice of "costing 'em to death."
290. Klein, supra note 117, at 7 (stressing that nineteenth-century condemnations involved no
massive redistributive takings).
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when urban redevelopment projects and urban highways have, over
the years, displaced millions of people from their homes and
businesses. 9' But that did not justify what went on. In California in
particular, there was an unwholesome, close relationship between the
railroads and the bench that took the form of a veritable revolving
door between the California Supreme Court and railroad
management. 92
Such unwholesome factors aside, in the nature of things, judges,
particularly appellate judges, tend to be older than the general
population, such that their perceptions are usually formed by earlier
customs and practices they experienced in their formative
professional years. Thus, the early judicial culture, accustomed to
seeing gifts of rights-of-way as a way of life, as well as frequent
uncompensated takings,' 9' viewed property owners dissatisfied with
condemnors' offers as overreaching. This judicial attitude survived
into modern times to a surprising degree. I vividly remember
appearing before the appellate courts in the 1960s where my
submissions on behalf of condennees were frequently the object of
undisguised judicial impatience or even hostility.
Also, in spite of the lack of supporting economic data, many
judges feared (and some still do) that genuinely just compensation of
condemnees for all their demonstrable economic losses would deter
railroad construction (and, later, other public projects). This most
likely accounts for the prevalence of the morally and economically
deficient judicial notion that strict adherence to the just
compensation mandate would be too costly, but as noted, it survives
until this day.294 As two commentators put it, "Denial of recovery for
consequential losses in eminent domain proceedings cannot be
attributed entirely to history. In part it seems the product of present
and conscious decision" on the part of judges. 95  Another
291. See Chester W. Hartman, Relocation: Illusory Promises and No Relief 57 VA. L. REV.
745, 745-46 (1971).
292. KEVIN STARR, INVENTING THE DREAM 200 (1985).
293. Scheiber, Private Property, supra note 118, at 21.
294. See, e.g., Temple City Redev. Agency v. Bayside Drive Ltd. P'ship, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d
728, 730 (Ct. App. 2007) (noting that the trial court refused to apply provisions of statute
awarding litigation expenses to condemnees upon dismissal of condemnation action for any
reason, because he thought that would provide a "windfall" to the condemnee, even though as
demonstrated by the Court of Appeal, the dismissal was economically beneficial to the
condemnor).
295. Spies & McCoid, supra note 113, at 450.
Spring 2007] 1137
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1065
commentator described such judicial expressions as judges' "fearful
guesstimates.
'2 96
This judicial attitude persists notwithstanding that its factual
bases are deficient, at least in the sense that they are assumed in
disregard of the truth, because no objective inquiry is permitted into
the government's ability to pay for what it takes. The result is that
judges cannot possibly know whether what they say when they
intone such lamentations is true.2 97 While it is incontestable that
some condemnors may have fewer resources than others and that fact
may affect the scope of public improvements undertaken by them,
one is hard put to understand why the threadbare condition of the
public purse in particular cases (even if genuine) should, as a matter
of generally applicable law, limit all condemnees' constitutional
right to receive just compensation in the context of projects that the
government-whatever its financial condition-does choose to
undertake. After all, the economic losses inflicted on condemnees
are a part of the overall project cost, the same as the cost of concrete
or labor expended in the construction.
The courts certainly do not hesitate to tell prison wardens who
treat their inmates in an inhumane fashion for lack of budgetary
resources that their limited funds are no excuse for unconstitutional
conduct. Besides, most public entities are well-funded, and no
reason appears why they should get a free ride while intoning
unwarranted poor-mouth lamentations. As Justice Holmes put it, the
public, like everyone else, is only entitled to that for which it pays.298
Perhaps more important, by and large, condemnors have ample
funds for the construction of necessary public facilities and thus lack
any colorable basis for suggesting that being required to make fair,
complete compensation to the victims of their ambitions would
296. Klein, supra note 117, at 35.
297. Bacich v. Bd. of Control of Cal., 144 P.2d 818, 839 (Cal. 1943) ("The construction of
improvements is bound to be discouraged by the multitude of claims that would arise, the costs of
negotiation with claimants or of litigation, and the amounts that claimants might recover."). As
one commentator put it, "Fears that an expanded scope of just compensation would 'cost too
much' have repeatedly served as a rationale ... for many courts which deny recovery for
emotional injuries" to condemnees. Klein, supra note 117, at 34. Yet, "[h]ow do the courts
know? Having never afforded compensation for most consequential injuries arising from eminent
domain, it becomes clear that the courts can not 'know."' Id.
298. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see also Griggs v. Allegheny County,
369 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1962) (noting that to wind up with a functioning airport, the airport operator
must acquire and pay for the necessary aircraft approaches).
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bankrupt them. 99 It is difficult to see why they should be the
beneficiaries of a system that the Wall Street Journal likened to "the
world's kleptocracies. 3 °° I emphasize the word "necessary" because
necessity is the Achilles' heel of modem eminent domain law.
While claiming to do so as a narrow exception, the Supreme Court
opened the door to private uses of the eminent domain power in the
early twentieth century by emphasizing dire necessity for
exploitation of natural resources, such as water in the arid West3"1
and mineral deposits,3"2 without which, said the Court, "the very
foundations of public welfare could not be laid. 303  But having done
so, a few years later, the Court proceeded to discard necessity as an
element of federal law of eminent domain,30" thus unwittingly
knocking out the prop holding up the expanded takings power.
Later, courts upheld statutes making condemnors' determination of
necessity well-nigh conclusive and thus de facto nonreviewable, and
in California officially nonjusticiable altogether, even where the
resolution of necessity was procured through fraud, bad faith, and
abuse of discretion.30 5 The upshot of all that is a legal regime in
299. As noted supra Part VI.B, underestimation of project costs and waste on a colossal scale
are ongoing features of the creation of public projects, so that if condemnors' professed fiscal
concerns are genuine rather than feigned, the government can cut back a bit on the "pork" and
address the frequent mismanagement of public projects, if that is what it takes to assure genuinely
just compensation to victims of the creation of genuinely necessary public projects. See, e.g.,
Danny Hakim, New High in '06 on Borrowing for Pet Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, at 1,
29 (noting that money borrowed by the State of New York during 2006 for assorted local "pork"
projects, known as "member items," "exceeded the total amount of borrowed money disbursed
over the previous eight years," and that "[o]ver the last decade, lawmakers have used the
[borrowed] money to finance a number of failed economic development projects, including a
now-defunct high-speed ferry between Rochester and Canada that cost the state millions of
dollars"); see also, Kerry Cavanaugh, Traffic Fees on Road to Nowhere, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Aug.
12, 2007, at 1 (noting that the City of Los Angeles collected nearly $5 million in street
improvement funds but failed to undertake any such improvements). In the context of such
government conduct it is difficult to summon sympathy for government functionaries'
lamentations that making "just" compensation genuinely just will deter construction of required
public works.
300. Editorial, Eminent Thievery, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2001, at A26.
301. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369-70 (1905).
302. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 529-31 (1906).
303. Id. at 531.
304. Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919).
305. People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Chevalier, 340 P.2d 598, 602-03 (Cal. 1959)
(determination of necessity is nonjusticiable even when procured through fraud, bad faith and
abuse of discretion). In 1976 the Chevalier rule was modified by sections 1245.255 and 1245.270
of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which provide respectively that the resolution is not
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which the power of eminent domain is freely exercised because it is
said to be necessary for the creation of public projects, even though
that rationale is unverifiable and provides incentives to reckless
expenditures of public funds on projects of dubious soundness. But
we are simultaneously told by the courts that statutory elements of
necessity (which include economic feasibility) are not to be inquired
into because necessity is "legislatively" determined by condemnors'
own say-so, with no objective judicial inquiry permitted into the
question of whether the project is merely a costly, wasteful
boondoggle,0 6 transparently contrived to transfer funds from the state
or federal treasury into the local economy. Nor do courts follow the
logic of their policy by holding that, inasmuch as the decision
regarding the size, scope, and design of the project are wholly within
the discretion of the condemnors, the latter should be required to pay
the true cost of the natural consequences of their own decision
making; that is, those who design costly projects should be required
to pay for them and not be permitted to fob off a part of that cost
onto innocent parties who fortuitously happen to wind up in the path
of those projects. Finally, if indeed full and fair compensation would
be so economically menacing to the government, it perforce is even
more menacing to individual condemnees who lack the government's
resources or its ability to spread the cost on the public, which
benefits from those projects.
Be all that as it may, the cold fact is that (with some regional
variations) today property owners whose land is taken, whether by
formal expropriation proceedings or by confiscatory regulations, do
not receive the same level of even-handed justice from American
courts as do other litigants who seek redress for other [constitutional]
wrongs inflicted upon them.
In the wake of Kelo, law journals have been suggesting reforms
in the law of eminent domain, although a few commentators have
had the moral temerity to assert that, though undercompensation is
rampant and some of the "public" uses for which private land is
conclusive when procured by "gross abuse of discretion" or bribery. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 1245.255, 1245.270 (West 2007).
306. Florida provides an exception to this rule on the justification that "[tihe reason that
Florida courts have consistently held that a judicial inquiry is permissible into the necessity of
taking stems from their awareness of the 'tunnel vision' that so often plagues a bureaucracy
which deems itself immune from judicial review." Knappen v. Div. of Admin., 352 So. 2d 885,
891 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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taken are anything but that, the substantive eminent domain
jurisprudence is satisfactory. There is at best a large question as to
whether such statements are insincere or merely uninformed. My
own view-based on forty years of practice in the field and
involvement in legislative reform efforts' 7-is that either way, they
are misguided. This century's experience supports that conclusion.
The congressional hearings of the 1960s disclosed prevailing
eminent domain practices to be a moral pit of government
overreaching and abuse of innocent people, in which
undercompensation and misrepresentations were the norm. 8 The
California Law Revision Commission, whose effort culminated with
the new Eminent Domain Law in 1976, took a disgracefully long
time (from 1956 to 1976) to produce a recommendation for reform
that made only some substantive changes in areas that were widely
acknowledged to involve the worst, morally intolerable injustices,
but did nothing to police and discourage the prevalence of
undercompensation. More recently, during the 1990s, in spite of the
Commission's Executive Director's justified suggestions for a
further reform effort clarifying the prevailing confusion in the
decisional law dealing with fee shifting in eminent domain cases, the
307. Since the late 1960s, I have been a consultant on eminent domain and inverse
condemnation to the California Law Revision Commission, a period that included the large-scale
revision of California Eminent Domain Law. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1230.010-070
(West 2007). I also served on the advisory committee on the Uniform Eminent Domain Code,
and I was consulted by the Japanese Construction Ministry on that country's contemplated
revisions in its expropriation law. On the basis of that long experience it is my unshakable belief
that, once the post-Kelo palliative chit-chat is done with, "bogus defenders of the stare decisis"
(to borrow Chief Justice Traynor's bon mot) who now argue that Kelo was neither new nor bad,
and that its flaws, if any, can be cured by fiddling with procedures, will fight like tigers against
the enactment of any meaningful, genuine reforms in the law of eminent domain, particularly any
substantial revisions to prevailing rules of compensability. They did so successfully to defeat the
Uniform Eminent Domain Code, and to blunt the effect of the Uniform Relocation Assistance
Act. They are certain to try doing so again. For an example of such efforts, see Timothy J.
Dowling, How to Think About Kelo After the Shouting Dies Down, 38 URB. LAW. 191, 198-99
(2006). In an outstanding example of bad timing, Dowling exhorts the procedures used in
Norwood, Ohio, as exemplary of his ideas of reform. But the Ohio Supreme Court has ruled the
Norwood redevelopment effort to be unconstitutional. City of Norwood v. Homey, 110 Ohio St.
3d 353, 2006-Ohio-3799, 853 N.E.2d 1115.
308. E.g., Hearings Before the Select Subcomm. on Real Property Acquisition, Comm. on
Public Works, 88th Cong. (1963); Hearing on H.R. 386 & Related Bills Before the H. Comm. on
Public Works, 90th Cong. (1968); see Curtis J. Berger & Patrick J. Rohan, The Nassau County
Study: An Empirical Look into the Practices of Condemnation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 430, 457
(1967) (discussing statistical findings that "convey explicit rebuke to a system which took
advantage of nearly everyone, but saved the greatest hardships for those-docile, duressed,
uncounselled-most entitled to solicitousness").
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Commission refused to entertain additional inquiries into needed
changes in eminent domain law. The Uniform Code Commissioners'
effort in producing the Uniform Eminent Domain Code in 1974
proved to be a failure because of fierce resistance of condemning
bodies. The Code was adopted (in modified form) only by Alabama
and New Mexico. It has by now been downgraded to the status of a
Model Code that is no longer visibly promoted.
Because the "reforms" suggested by the defenders of the status
quo in the wake of Kelo are not substantive, they can have no direct
impact on the outcome of eminent domain litigation and, if adopted,
would increase the cost to condemnees who would now have to jump
through additional procedural hoops in pursuit of unobtainable
substantive relief.3 °9 One commentator has come up with the antic
notion that, in spite of the repeated concessions by the Supreme
Court and other courts that "just compensation" is incomplete and
harsh, and in spite of studies and commentaries published over a
period of decades criticizing the deplorable state of eminent domain
law, no substantive reform in compensation law is necessary because
the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act makes up for the
shortcomings of eminent domain law.31°
309. Thomas W. Merrill, The Misplaced Flight to Substance, PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr.
2005, at 16, 18. Compare the same author's conclusion that "just compensation" is actually
partial compensation. See supra note 116.
310. Compare Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain,
105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 121-123 (2006), with supra note 116 and accompanying text. While, as
noted, the URA has improved things somewhat, and when applicable, it betters the lot of
condemnees on the lowest rungs of the socio-economic ladder (who before the enactment of URA
got nothing), it does not address or cure the systemic, pervasive problem of undervaluation and
undercompensation in contested cases because it does not indemnify condemnees and is not
enforceable by them. See Boston v. United States, 424 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Will-Tex
Plastics Mfg., Inc., v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 346 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 478
F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1973); Rubin v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 347 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Pa.
1972); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (2000). This much is conceded by the government. See U.S.
Dept. of Transp., Fed. Highway Admin., Evaluation of State Condemnation Process, http://
www.fhwa.dot.gov/REALESTATE/cndmst.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).
Paradoxically, in an earlier article Professor Garnett argued that "the measure of
damages awarded in an eminent-domain proceeding-namely, the fair market value of the
property-frequently fails to make property owners 'whole."' Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-
Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 945 (2003). I agree with that
statement, except that, for reasons explored herein, I would substitute "axiomatically" for
"frequently." See id. at 948 (noting that the measure of damages falls short with respect to
relocation expenses, goodwill associated with a business's physical location, or the cost of
replacing the condemned property).
"[-UN]EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LA W"
I suggest that the problem lies primarily in judicial attitudes and
judges' unwillingness to give effect to the constitutional mandate
that takings be for public use, not private enrichment, and that "just"
compensation be just in fact, not just "panoramic" judicial window
dressing. The fundamental problem is that courts vainly try to
balance two incompatible policies. As the Supreme Court put it in
United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson"l: "The law of eminent
domain is fashioned out of the conflict between the people's interest
in public projects and the principle of indemnity . ". . ." ' That
seemingly fair statement actually conceals serious problems. First, it
presents us with a false choice-there is no such conflict. The
government decides what it needs and what it will cost to satisfy that
need, and proceeds accordingly. I am not aware of any studies
suggesting that American governments are unable to construct
necessary public improvements without engaging in kleptocratic
practices of shortchanging condemnees. Even as the Court spoke in
Powelson, when the country was emerging from the Great
Depression, there was no lack of public funds for the construction of
a series of huge public works, notably dams. The problem, very
much in the public eye of late, is that, in the name of creating public
projects, the government is frequently spending huge sums on
construction of unneeded, wasteful white elephants whose public
benefit is at best dubious and whose not-so-tacit rationale is merely
to extract money from the federal treasury and, by means of
congressional "earmarks," transfer it to the congresspersons' home
states and districts.
Assuming a modicum of engineering skill and appraisal
integrity, the cost of contemplated public projects should be
understood before commencing them, without government lawyers
whining in court after government decisions to proceed have already
been made that if condemnees receive genuinely just compensation,
the civilized world as we know it will surely end.313 The idea that the
311. 319 U.S. 266 (1943).
312. Id. at 280.
313. If you think that this statement is hyperbolic, consider the following passage from the
Brief of Respondent State of Cal. Dep't of Pub. Works at 39, Lombardy v. Peter Kiewit Sons'
Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 240 (Ct. App. 1968) (2d Civ. No. 31774):
California is on the threshold of the most intensive urbanization in the history of
mankind. Streets, roads, freeways, and other forms of rapid transit are the life-giving
arteries of this urban civilization. To allow claims of the type presented in the case at
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government is deterred from creating necessary public projects
because it lacks funds needed to indemnify victimized landowners
for all their demonstrable economic losses is ludicrous, or at least
wholly unsubstantiated. Second, these days the cost of construction
of genuinely public projects, such as water projects and highways, is
not the source of the problem, as evidenced by the fact that the
people, certainly in California, unhesitatingly vote in favor of bonds
with which to finance them. Rather, the public has been rightly
aroused by government, notably congressional, profligacy in wasting
huge sums on useless "earmarks" and by the Supreme Court's newly
minted notion that the use of the power of eminent domain is proper
to enrich powerful private interests at the expense of lower-middle-
class homeowners, and then, in an Orwellian linguistic performance,
proclaiming the result to be a "public benefit."
Interestingly, when the Powelson Court spoke, there were no
mass redevelopment condemnations of this type being used for
private gain, and takings were often of vacant land. The Court's
reference to "public projects" was thus largely accurate. It no longer
is. It is time that the Court take into account the massive changes in
America that have taken place since 1943 and the huge
displacements of urban populations that were unthinkable in the
1940s. Finally, however the government means to use the power of
eminent domain, the Constitution requires payment of just
compensation, but the payments made to condemnees under
prevailing law are neither "compensation" nor are they "just," as the
courts themselves acknowledge.
Much good would be accomplished if judges would refrain from
twisting their analysis to achieve desired results, with an eye on their
"fearful guesstimates," as one commentator put it, of the fiscal
bar would not only preclude new and badly needed roads but would necessarily force
the closing of many existing roads rather than pay the tribute which could be exacted
by the public for continued passage upon such roads by the public. The urban
civilization would have found a new method of self-strangulation.
Evidently influenced by such twaddle, the Lombardy court ruled in favor of the State,
but its opinion was so wretched that it was later expressly disapproved by the California Supreme
Court, not once, but twice. See S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Bourgerie, 507 P.2d 964, 968 (Cal. 1973)
(disapproving Lombardy's holding regarding compensability of covenants running with the land);
Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 496 P.2d 480, 489-91 (Cal. 1972) (disapproving Lombardy's
holding regarding government immunity for nuisance). To the best of my knowledge, "urban
civilization" in California has not come to an end in the ensuing quarter century, although the jury
is still out on the matter of "mosh pits."
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impact of the outcomes. Judges are not qualified and have no
business playing at government fiscal management by avowedly
distorting case outcomes to avoid what they fear will be
constitutionally required results that imperil the creation of public
projects. Making such fiscal planning judgments, as the courts never
tire of telling us when the right to take is challenged, is a function of
the legislative and executive branches of government that undertake
funding and construction of public projects, 14 not of the courts.
Judges would therefore be well advised to balance their quest for
judicial independence with their duty of judicial impartiality, to
perform their basic adjudicative function accordingly, and to treat
condemnees no worse than litigants in other fields of law. Merely
giving some substance to the platitudinous but insincere judicial
exhortations of fairness, justice and indemnity would go a long way
toward rectifying much of the prevailing deplorable state of eminent
domain law whose defenders concede to be harsh and unjust.
X. CONCLUSION
Whatever the quality of justice meted out to condemnees may
be, it is not "Equal Justice Under Law," notwithstanding that this
platitude is carved in stone over the entrance to the U.S. Supreme
Court. "Unequal Justice Under Law" might provide a more
appropriate and certainly a more truthful insight into the litigational
reality administered by that Court in takings cases.
I hope that the American people, who have now been properly
aroused by the unabashed judicial extremism of the Kelo decision
and who now understand what "redevelopment" really means, will
maintain pressure on their government and their legislators, and in
the long run, will give the lie to enablers and cynics who talk a good
game in the face of justified public anger but who are patiently
awaiting a dissipation of popular feelings to get back to business as
usual. I hope that they will fail and that the people will now insist on
long overdue reform that at long last shines some light into this "dark
comer of the law. 31 5
314. See supra note 289.
315. The quoted characterization was coined by Lewis Orgel in his treatise. 2 LEWIS ORGEL,
VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 266 (2d ed. 1953).
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APPENDIX
Comparison of Condemnors' Offers and Evidence with Awards
or Settlements in Large California Condemnation Cases
Condemnor's Offer (0); Condemnor's
Case Name Evidence (E); Settlement (S); Deposit
(D); Final Verdict (V)
Regents of the Univ. of $3,250,000 (E)
Cal. v. Morris
316  $4,800,000 (V)
$4,000,000 (S)
City of Los Angeles v. $4,000,000 (E)
Retlaw Enters., Inc." 7  $14,350,000 (V)
City of Burbank v. $38,000,000 (0)
Lockheed Martin Corp."' $86,000,000 (V)
L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. $13,650,745 (D)
3434 S. Grand Ave.3 9  $21,980,000 (V)
Metro. Water Dist. of S. $7,000,000 (E)
Cal. v. Domenigoni3 20 $33,750,000 (V)
316. 72 Cal. Rptr. 406 (Ct. App. 1968). The verdict at the end of the first trial was
$3,700,000. It was reversed on appeal because of misconduct of condemnor's appraiser and trial
counsel. Following retrial the jury brought in a verdict of $4,800,000, and the case settled for
$4,000,000. Id. at 408
317. 546 P.2d 1380(Cal. 1976).
318. Andrew Blankstein, Airport Told to Pay More for Lockheed Plant Site, L.A. TIMES, June
9, 1999, at Bl. In addition to the verdict, the airport authority had to pay $5.6 million in
precondemnation damages, $10 million in interest, and Lockheed's attorneys' fees. Paul Clinton,
Jury: 'B-6' Worth $86 M, BURBANK LEADER, June 9, 1999, at 1.
319. No. B172620, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9628 (Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2005).
320. Interview with Michael M. Berger, Partner, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP, in Los
Angeles, CA (Oct. 21, 2007). Mr. Berger served as counsel for the defendant in Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California v. Domenigoni in the Riverside County Superior Court in
1995. The $43,200,000 verdict was remitted by the trial court to $33,750,000, and the owners
recovered an additional $4,416,966 in litigation expenses.
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APPENDIX (CONTINUED)
321. County of San Diego v. Rancho Vista Del Mar, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 675 (Ct. App. 1993).
The original jury verdict of $55 million was remitted by the trial court to $23 million. Following
appeal and remand, the case settled for $26.2 million, plus interest in the amount of $12.5 million,
for a total of $38.7 million. The settlement is described in Parker, Milliken, Clark, O'Hara &
Samuelian v. De La Fuente, No. D041030, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5304, at * 11 (Ct. App.
June 4, 2004).
322. Interview with Michael M. Berger, Partner, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP, in Los
Angeles, CA (Oct. 21, 2007). Mr. Berger served as counsel for the defendant in People ex rel.
Department of Transportation v. Southern California Edison Co., 996 P.2d 711 (Cal. 2000). In
spite of its appraiser's testimony of $4,285,000 for the part taken, plus $412,000 in severance
damages, CalTrans deposited only $234,485 into court as its "good faith" estimate of probable
just compensation.
323. Kevin Roderick, Union Station Price Tag Is a Jolt, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1984, pt. I, at 3.
After CalTrans abandoned the condemnation instead of paying the verdict, the court awarded $1
million in attorneys' fees to the condemnee. Myrna Oliver, State, L.A. Hit with $1-Million Legal
Bill, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1984, Part II at 3.
324. People ex rel. Dep't Pub. Works v. City of Los Angeles, 77 Cal. Rptr. 875 (Ct. App.
1969).
325. Interview with John C. Murphy, Partner, Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, in Orange
County, CA (Oct. 24, 2007). Mr. Murphy served as counsel for the defendant in People ex rel.
Department of Transportation v. Calvary Deaf Church in 2006. See Dan Weikel, Church Wins
Land Value Battle, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at B4.
County of San Diego v. $5,000,000 (E)
Rancho Vista Del Mar, $,714,594 (E)
Inc. 321  $38,714,594 (S)
People ex rel. Dep't of $234,485 (D)
Transp. v. S. Cal. Edison $4,5 (V)
Co.322  $49,500,000 (V)
CalTrans v. Union $25,000,000 (E)
Station323  $84,700,000 (V)
People ex rel. Dep't of
Pub. Works v. City of $1,809,315 (E)
L.A. 32 4  $4,339,234 (V)
People ex rel. Dep't of
Transp. v. Calvary Deaf $1,410,000 (0)
Church 325 $4,600,000 (S)
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APPENDIX (CONTINUED)
326. Interview with John C. Murphy, Partner, Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, in Orange
County, CA (Oct. 24, 2007). Mr. Murphy also served as counsel for the defendant in People ex
rel. Department of Transportation v. Canyon Springs LLC in Riverside County Superior Court.
327. Telephone Interview with Norman Matteoni, Partner, Matteoni, O'Laughlin &
Hechtman, in San Jose, CA (Nov. 4, 2007). Mr. Matteoni served as counsel in Santa Clara
Valley Transit District v. SJW Land in 2004.
328. Id. Mr. Matteoni also served as counsel in San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit
District v. Hertz, Inc., which settled in 2004.
329. Telephone Interview with A.J. Hazarabedian, Founder, Eminent Domain Law Group, in
Glendale, CA (Nov. 14, 2007). Mr. Hazarabedian served as counsel in Inglewood Redevelopment
Agency v. Eschwege, which settled in 2005.
330. Id. Mr. Hazarabedian also served as counsel in Val Verde School District v. Carolino
Construction, which settled in 2005.
People ex rel. Dep't of $1,054,000 (0)
Transp. v. Canyon Springs $3,800,000 (S)
LLC
3 2 6
Santa Clara Valley Transit $1,900,000 (0)
Dist. v. SJW Land3 27  $9,650,000 (S)
S.F. Bay Area Rapid $9,134,000 (D)
Transit Dist. v. Hertz,
Inc.3 28  $23,500,000 (S)
Inglewood Redev. Agency $990,000 (0)
v. Eschwege 329  $2,100,000 (S)
Val Verde Sch. Dist. v. $1,740,000 (0)
Carolino Constr.33° $3,450,000 (S)
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